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ABSTRACT
Income Variability: Effects on U.S. Income Inequality and Tax Progressivity
by
David Splinter
Income variability explains a significant fraction of the increase in annual income in-
equality. Chapter 2 considers the impact of variability on tax unit inequality. Using
income tax return panel data, I estimate that up to a fifth of the increase in top
one percent income shares between the early 1980s and 2000s was caused by vari-
ability. Increased income variability over this period resulted from mean-reverting
fluctuations in the bottom quintile and top one percent. Variability in the top of the
distribution seems partly driven by permanent income shifting in response to the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
Chapter 3 examines the individual earnings distribution. Using Social Security Ad-
ministration earnings panel data, I estimate that variability explains half of the in-
crease in annual inequality in the bottom half of the distribution between 1973 and
1985. When workers with years of zero earnings are included, increasing earnings
variability explains almost all of this group’s increase in inequality. The increase in
earnings variability appears to be explained by an increased fraction of working age
ii
men with years of zero earnings.
Annual individual earnings inequality in the bottom half of the distribution not only
increased with variability in the 1970s and 1980s, but also fell with variability in the
1950s and early 1960s. This suggests that the U-shaped trend in income inequality
observed over these decades was partly caused by first a fall and then a rise in earn-
ings variability.
Between 1985 and 2000, falling variability caused most of the decline in annual earn-
ings inequality within the bottom half of the distribution. Within the top of the
distribution, earnings inequality increased over this period because of changes in per-
manent earnings and not increasing variability.
Income variability means that in a progressive tax system annual and lifetime federal
tax rates can diverge. Chapter 4 shows that on an annual basis, those at the bottom
of the distribution pay little or no federal income taxes, while on a lifetime basis they
pay average tax rates about five percentage points higher. Income variability also
means there is a trade-off between vertical and horizontal equity.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Many researchers have documented increasing annual income inequality in the U.S.
over the last four decades. While increasing returns to skill and technological change
are common explanations, many other factors could contribute to increasing income
dispersion.1 Piketty and Saez (2003) propose that social norms could have become
more accepting of inequality. Others point to compositional changes, such as an
increase in the fraction of single households (Fitzgerald, 2008; Levy, 1987) and
assortative mating (Schwartz, 2010; Fernndez and Rogerson, 2001). This dissertation
uses tax return and Social Security Administration panel data to show that a
significant fraction of the increase in inequality is explained by income variability.
Changes in tax policy and in men’s employment patterns are identified as especially
important sources of changing variability.
Income variability implies that workers can have different incomes in a given
year, creating annual inequality, but may have more similar incomes when averaged
over a number of years, leading to lower multi-year inequality. In this case, variability
acts as an equalizer of longer-term incomes. This relates to what other authors
refer to as mobility (Buchinsky and Hunt, 1999; Kopczuk, Saez and Song, 2010),
1Katz and Autor (1999) and Goldin and Katz (2001) document rising inequality. Katz and
Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) and Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) discuss
returns to skill. Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Acemoglu (2002), Bound and Johnson (1992),
Autor, Katz and Kearney (2008) and Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) address technological change.
2instability (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994, 2009; Hacker and Jacobs, 2008; Haider,
2001), transitory variance (Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2012), and volatility (Hertz,
2007; Jensen and Shore, 2008).2
Income variability has increased at both the top and bottom of the distribu-
tion. I estimate that increasing tax unit income variability explains up to a fifth
of the increase in top one percent income shares between the early 1980s and early
2000s. In the bottom half of the individual earnings distribution, I find that almost
all of the increase in individual earnings inequality between the early 1970s and
mid-1980s was caused by earnings variability. Administrative data reveal that the
fraction of prime-age men with years of zero earnings grew dramatically and caused
most of this increase in earnings variability.
While many authors have estimated trends in income and earnings variabil-
ity,3 few studies show how variability affects inequality. Gottschalk and Moffitt
(2009) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate that increasing
earnings instability caused about half of the increase in male earnings inequality
from 1974 to 1990. They also document a dramatic increase in family income
instability since the late 1980s but do not estimate the impact on inequality. In
contrast, Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010, hereafter KSS) use Social Security data
to estimate that individual earnings variability explains little of the increase in
2Following Congressional Budget Office (2008b), I use the term variability, as I measure a broad
range of income and earnings shocks, including years of low or zero earnings.
3Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2008) estimate that between 1971 and 2004 household income
volatility increased by one-third. Shin and Solon (2011) find that male earnings volatility increased
in the 1970s and then remained relatively constant until around 2000. Both of these papers provide
summaries of other studies.
3earnings inequality. This dissertation reconciles these different findings for individual
earnings. Moreover, I show how variability affects tax unit income inequality, which
is roughly similar to household inequality measures that are commonly used.
I also demonstrate that the use of different summary statistics to measure in-
come dispersion can lead to different results. It appears that Gottschalk and Moffitt
(2009) find a large increase in earnings instability in part because they measure
dispersion with the variance of log earnings, which emphasizes the bottom of the
distribution. By comparison, KSS appear to have estimated a small and constant
level of earnings variability because they measure dispersion with Gini coefficients,
which emphasize the middle of the distribution (Sen and Foster, 1973). The
difference in their results arises primarily because earnings variability is greatest
at the bottom of the distribution and has increased mostly at the bottom and top
of the distribution, and these effects are poorly measured by changes in the Gini
coefficient, which is relatively insensitive to changes at the ends of the distribution.
Relying on a single summary statistic to measure income dispersion can also
lead to suspect interpretations of the data. For example, Hacker (2008) interprets
increasing earnings volatility as affecting the middle class, when the summary
statistics he uses are likely capturing increasing volatility at the bottom of the
distribution. To address these issues, I provide and compare results for a number
of different dispersion measures, each of which emphasize a different part of the
distribution. I also measure inequality using income shares, which shows how income
variability changed at the top and bottom of the distribution. Using these measures
and new panel data, I provide perhaps the first estimates of income variability for
4the top one percent of the income distribution. These measures also allow me to
keep workers with years of zero earnings in my sample, revealing important trends
in movements in and out of employment by men since the 1950s and their effects on
earnings inequality.
1.1 Tax Unit Income Inequality
Whereas income variability studies often drop the top one percent of the distribution
because of top-coding or reporting concerns, tax return panel data allows me to
study the effect of income variability within the top one percent. After matching
Piketty and Saez (2003) income definitions and shares, I find that a tenth of the
increase in top one percent income shares that occurred between the early 1980s
and early 2000s was explained by five-year variability. Averaging income over longer
periods of time captures more income fluctuations. Eleven-year variability explains
a fifth of the increase in top one percent income shares.
Increasing top income concentration and variability appear to be caused in
part by permanent income shifting in response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This
reform lowered the top personal tax rate below the corporate tax rate, causing some
closely-held businesses to convert from C-corporations to pass-through entities. This
implies that the reporting of relatively variable business profits shifted from corporate
to personal tax returns, both increasing top income variability and measured top
income shares. The fraction of top one percent income (excluding capital gains) from
pass-through profits jumped from 11 to 21 percent in the two years following the
1986 reform—accompanying a large jump in variability—and has steadily increased
5to about 30 percent (Piketty and Saez, 2003).
Considering the entire distribution, I find that between the early 1980s and
2000s, variability explains a quarter of the increase in after-tax income inequality
and a third of the increase in earnings inequality (when excluding negative and
zero earnings). Most of this earnings variability comes from the bottom quintile
and top one percent; specifically, from gains at the bottom of the distribution and
losses at the top. This mean reversion results from negative shocks temporarily
pushing families into low earnings groups, and positive shocks temporarily inflating
the earnings of families at the top of the distribution.
1.2 Individual Earnings Inequality
Using Social Security Administration panel data, I estimate that earnings vari-
ability explains half of the increase in annual inequality in the bottom half of the
distribution between 1973 and 1985. When workers with years of zero earnings are
included, increasing earnings variability explains almost all of this group’s increase in
inequality. The increase in earnings variability appears to be driven by an increased
fraction of working age men with years of zero earnings, reflecting more movements
in and out of employment.
Annual individual earnings inequality in the bottom half of the distribution
not only increased with variability in the 1970s and 1980s, but also fell with
variability in the 1950s and early 1960s. This suggests that the U-shaped trend in
income inequality observed over this period was partly caused by first a fall and then
6a rise in earnings variability.
The period of the Great Moderation is distinguished by a period of lower
macroeconomic volatility. Individual earnings variability may have also decreased
during the Great Moderation, but the evidence for this is not clear. A number of
studies have found falling earnings variability (Sabelhaus and Song, 2009, 2010;
Congressional Budget Office, 2008b), while others have found relatively stable
earnings variability (Gottschalk, McEntarfer and Moffitt, 2008; Celik et al., 2009;
DeBacker et al., 2010) or even increasing variability (Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel,
2008). As noted above, however, looking only at the entire distribution may obscure
different within-group trends. I find decreasing inequality in the bottom half of
the distribution between 1985 and 2000, which was largely caused by decreasing
variability, and increasing inequality in the top of the distribution, which was caused
by increasing permanent earnings inequality.
I also show that studies measuring dispersion with the variance of log earn-
ings, which often drop workers from the sample who have low or zero earnings,
will miss some important variability trends caused by movements in and out of
employment.4 The high fraction of women with zero earnings in a given year also
4Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994, 2009) trim the bottom one percent because low earnings “distort
estimates of inequality based on the variance of log income because, as incomes go to zero, the log
of income goes to minus infinity, thus driving the variance of log income to infinity. As a result,
even small absolute changes in incomes at the bottom of the distribution can have large effects
on estimates of the instability of incomes.” (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 2009, p. 10) Dropping only
the bottom one percent is sufficient to address this in the PSID, as a very small fraction of prime-
age white males report extremely low earnings in a given year. In contrast, in Social Security
Administration earnings data between five and eleven percent of prime-age men had zero earnings
in a year (this is after dropping years of zero earnings at the ends of the prime-age window). This
suggests that male earnings reported in surveys may be biased upward in years of low earnings.
7means that studies usually only consider male earnings variability. My alternative
dispersion measures allow me to overcome issues with zero earnings and to retain
women in my sample of individual earnings. The prevalence and strong impact of
years with zero earnings found in this study suggests that the extensive margin
will be important in correctly specifying parametric earnings processes for men and
women.
A further contribution of this research is that rather than providing estimates
based on survey data from a few thousand workers, I use two administrative panels,
each with about a quarter million men and women beginning almost two decades
before the PSID. In fact, these appear to be the longest public-use panels of U.S.
earnings available and allow me to measure earnings variability over workers’ entire
lifetimes. This is important because it shows how variability increases with the
number of years over which earnings are averaged.
1.3 Lifetime Tax Progressivity
Tax progressivity estimates traditionally use annual tax burdens and incomes to
show how tax burdens vary over the income distribution. But if individuals and
households can smooth consumption over time, then tax progressivity should be
considered from a multi-year or perhaps even lifetime perspective. Annual and
multi-year effective tax rates may differ significantly in a progressive tax system
because of income variability. While the bottom decile of consistent tax filers pays
little or no federal income taxes in a given year, I estimate that over eleven years,
Gottschalk and Huynh (2010) compare tax data to SIPP survey responses and find that tax based
earnings are less equal, as there is a higher fraction of low earnings.
8these families pay average effective tax rates of about five percent. I also estimate
that the bottom half of the individual earnings distribution pays more taxes over
their lifetimes than annual measures suggest.
Income variability also creates horizontal equity issues not apparent with an-
nual estimates because individuals and tax units who are “equal” in terms of a
multi-year income measure will not be treated “equally” under a progressive tax
system. For example, when two workers have equal lifetime income, the worker
with the more variable income will often pay more taxes over their lifetime. I
estimate that some workers in the fifth lifetime earnings decile pay taxes equal to
nine percent of their lifetime earnings, while others pay up to fourteen percent. A
more progressive tax system and a larger divergence in income variability between
workers with similar lifetime incomes will increase this horizontal inequity. So while
economists are familiar with the trade-off between vertical equity and efficiency,
income variability means there is also a trade-off between vertical and horizontal
equity, where vertical equity is measured by the progressivity of tax rates on annual
income and horizontal equity considers multi-year measures of taxes and income.
9Chapter 2
Income Variability in the United States: One
Cause of Increasing Annual Income Inequality
2.1 Introduction
Annual income inequality in the U.S. has increased dramatically over the last four
decades. Much of increasing U.S. income inequality has been driven by growing
concentration at the top of the distribution. This chapter uses tax return panel data
to estimate that up to a fifth of the increase in top one percent income shares are
explained by income variability. So while annual income concentration among the
top one percent grew significantly since the mid-1980s (Piketty and Saez, 2003),
income variability among these top earners increased at the same time. Increasing
top income concentration and variability appear caused in part by permanent income
shifting in response to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. I also find a large and growing
amount of variability in the bottom quintile of the distribution.
Most studies of variability have focused on earnings, rather than income. Earnings
variability estimates can vary significantly when using different earnings definitions,
sample restrictions, and measures of dispersion. Studies that include self-employment
earnings and low-earnings workers and measure dispersion using the variance of log
earnings show a large effect of variability on inequality. By comparison, studies that
exclude self-employment earnings and low-earnings workers and use Gini coefficients
10
show a small effect.
For example, Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) use the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) to estimate that about half of the increase in annual male earnings
inequality from 1974 to 1990 was caused by increasing instability. They define tran-
sitory earnings as the difference between annual and nine-year average log earnings
and instability as the variance of these transitory components. I extend this research
in a number of ways. First, I use a more straightforward approach to measure the
impact of earnings variability on inequality by comparing inequalities of annual
and multi-year earnings. Second, I use a number of dispersion measures, including
generalized entropy measures and income shares. These measures allow me to identify
the parts of the distribution causing inequality and variability changes. Third, while
Gottschalk and Moffitt trim the top one percent because of top-coding issues, I use a
panel of tax returns to show the impact of income variability from the top one percent.
By comparison, Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010) find a small effect of earnings
variability on inequality in a study that uses Social Security data, excludes self-
employment earnings and low-earnings workers (below $2,575 in 2004 dollars), and
estimates dispersion with Gini coefficients. I show that such an approach may be
somewhat misleading because self-employment earnings and low-earnings workers
contribute significantly to earnings variability. In addition, the Gini coefficient seems
to underestimate the impact of variability relative to alternative dispersion measures
because it emphasizes the middle of the distribution (Sen and Foster, 1973) and thus
downplays the effects of the increasingly volatile ends of the distribution.
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Most studies of earnings variability only consider individual male earnings. If
one considers earnings inequality as a proxy for consumption inequality, then
household income seems like the natural focus, as consumption decisions are thought
to be made at the household level. Tax unit level income provides an approximation
of household income, especially for the top of the distribution.1 DeBacker et al.
(2010) is perhaps the only other study using tax unit level data to estimate the
impact of variability on inequality. The authors estimate that between 1987 and
2006, instability caused 30 to 40 percent of the increase in annual tax unit income
inequality. Though their results are similar to those I estimate, their data starts
later than that used in this study and misses some of the 1980s increase in top one
percent income concentration.
Section 2 of this chapter reviews recent estimates of income and earnings vari-
ability. Section 3 explains how earnings variability is measured. Section 4 describes
the panel data used in this study. Section 5 examines top one percent income shares.
Section 6 examines tax unit income variability across the distribution. Section 7
considers earnings variability. Section 8 discusses causes of increasing variability in
the top of the distribution.
2.2 Evidence for Increasing Short-term Volatility
A number of papers find increasing short-term volatility in the U.S. since the 1970s,
although they often do not integrate these findings with increasing inequality. Using
1Burkhauser, Larrimore and Simon (2012) show some differences between tax unit and household
income. Not including dependents, they estimate that in the 1980s about 80 percent of households
had only one tax unit, while about 16 percent of households had two tax units.
12
the PSID, Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2008) estimate that between 1971 and 2004
household income volatility increased by one-third. Jensen and Shore (2008) also
find increasing volatility with the PSID.
Earnings variability at the bottom and top of the distribution may contribute
significantly to overall earnings variability. Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) show that
male transitory earnings were about three times larger in the bottom quarter of the
distribution. Sabelhaus and Song (2009) find that adding the bottom ten percent of
Social Security earnings records for workers age 25 to 55 causes volatility to double.
Jensen and Shore (2008) find that increasing income volatility since the 1970s has
not affected most individuals; the largest volatility increases were in the top five
percent of the income distribution and volatile incomes were much more likely among
the self-employed and those self-identified as risk-tolerant. Splinter, Bryant and
Diamond (2009) find large earnings mean reversion in the 2000s among tax units at
the bottom and top of the distribution of consistent filers, with a bottom quintile
average annual earnings gain of 37 percent ($3,000) and top 0.01 percent average
loss of 27 percent ($3 million).
Rather than relying only on income, many studies instead consider consump-
tion as a better proxy of welfare. Keys (2006, p. 7) expresses the conventional
finding: “Consumption volatility is drastically smaller than earnings volatility,
and suggests that households are able to smooth consumption across years by
borrowing and saving accordingly.” Similarly, Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston
(2008) explain the growing gap between income and consumption inequality by the
increase in transitory income shocks, which is more insurable than permanent income
13
shocks. Krueger and Perri (2006) estimate that during the 1980s within group
income inequality increased three times more than consumption inequality. They
theorize that improved credit markets allowed for better consumption smoothing.
Dynarski and Gruber (1997) estimate that in the 1970s and 1980s only about 10
percent of household head earnings variability translated into changes in nondurable
consumption. Despite improved consumption smoothing, these papers still find that
consumption volatility has increased significantly. Gorbachev (2011) estimates that
the mean volatility of household food consumption increased 60 percent between
1968 and 1985, suggesting an important impact of rising income variability on
consumption.
While consumption inequality may serve as the closest approximation to wel-
fare inequality, multi-year income still may give a better measure than annual
incomes. Slemrod (1992) argues that inequality is better represented by multi-year
incomes, or what he calls “time-exposure income”, rather than annual or “snapshot
income”, which can give a distorted view of long-term well-being. The increase in
the top one percent income concentration caused by variability estimated in this
study should be interpreted within this framework—high income households should
be able to smooth spending over a number of years and so consumption inequality,
proxied by multi-year incomes, should increase less than annual income inequality.
2.3 Measuring Earnings Variability
Simple relationships between annual and multi-year earnings inequalities can be
used to estimate the fraction of increasing annual inequality caused by increasing
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variability. Following Shorrocks (1978); Maasoumi and Zandvakili (1990); Fields
(2010), and Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010), Equation 2.1 defines the percentage
of annual inequality explained by variability as the relative gap between annual
and multi-year inequalities—a version of Shorrocks indices—where Ineq can be any
number of dispersion measures: Theil index, Gini coefficient, income shares, etc.
%V ariability =
IneqAnnual − IneqMulti−year
IneqAnnual
(2.1)
Annual inequality measures the dispersion of annual income, Y , and are usu-
ally averaged over the multi-year period to give smoothed annual inequalities:
IneqSmoothedAnnual =
∑T
t=1 Ineq(Yt)
T
. Smoothed annual inequalities should re-
move the cyclical component of variability. Multi-year inequality measures the
dispersion of observation level incomes averaged over the multi-year period:
IneqMulti−year = Ineq
(∑T
t=1 Yt
T
)
.
This measure of variability can be used to examine inequality changes between two
points in time. The percentage variability is used to calculate the overall change
(Equation 2.2) and the percentage change (Equation 2.3) of annual inequality caused
by variability. Equation 2.2 makes clear that variability causes annual inequality to
increase by growing the gap between annual and multi-year inequalities.
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∆IneqAnnualfromV ariability
= (%V ariability · IneqAnnual)End − (%V ariability · IneqAnnual)Begin
= (IneqAnnual − IneqMulti−year)End − (IneqAnnual − IneqMulti−year)Begin (2.2)
%∆IneqAnnualfromV ariability =
∆IneqAnnualfromV ariability
∆IneqAnnual
(2.3)
A few examples illustrate how these measures work. If the percentage of income
inequality caused by variability is constant over a period, then this percent-
age also measures how much of the change in annual inequality was caused by
variability. So if the annual Gini increased from 0.50 to 0.60 and 20 percent
of inequality was caused by variability at the beginning and end of the period,
then the fraction of the inequality increase caused by variability is also 20 per-
cent: [(0.20 · 0.60) − (0.20 · 0.50)]/(0.60 − 0.50) = 0.20. A small increase in
%Variability can also explain a significant fraction of an inequality increase.
For the same increase in annual Gini, if %Variability increased from 10 to
25 percent, then variability would have caused all of the inequality increase:
[(0.25 · 0.60) − (0.10 · 0.50)]/(0.60 − 0.50) = 1.0. In this case, permanent income
inequality remained at 0.45, while annual inequality due to variability increased from
0.05 to 0.15.
Table 2.1 shows an example of measuring variability with this method using
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the top one percent income share as the measure of inequality. Top income shares
shows clearly how rank reversals and mean reversion cause income variability. In
the first set of three years, the three top earners rotate positions, with one falling
out of the top one percent each year. In addition to this rank reversal, there is
also mean reversion—incomes rise after a bad year and fall after an especially good
year. The total three-year income for A and B is 21 and for C is 18. This means
A and B are in the top one percent when considering three-year average earnings,
and their average earnings share is: (21/3) + (21/3) = 14. The gap between an-
nual and three-year incomes shares gives a %Variability of (16%−14%)/16% = 12.5%.
The second three year period—years 4 through 6—shows an increase in both
income concentration and variability. The three top earners have larger incomes in
their best years but also no income in their worst years. So despite annual income
shares increasing substantially, three-year average income shares only increase
to 16%. Half of the inequality increase is explained by increasing variability:
[(20% · 20%) − (12.5% · 16%)]/(20% − 16%) = 50%.
Table 2.1 : Fictional example of top one percent income shares and fraction of in-
equality explained by variability
Year Income Shares Top 1% Income Shares Variability
P0 P1-P98 P99 Top 1% Annual 3-Year Avg. over 3-Years
1 0 80 4A 7B 9C 16%
2 0 80 4B 5C 11A 16% 14% 12.5%
3 0 80 4C 6A 10B 16%
4 0A 80 10B 10C 20%
5 0B 80 2C 18A 20% 16% 20%
6 0C 80 6A 14B 20%
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Whereas the previous example considered incomes averaged over only three years,
the effect of income variability on inequality will change with the length of time
considered (Poterba, 1989; Barthold, 1993). Ultimately, the appropriate length of
time will depend on our concern. For an analysis of poor households unable to insure
against transitory shocks, we may focus on the short-term over three or five years
(Newman, 2006; Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2008). For an analysis of high-skill
workers who knowingly forgo income to earn advanced degrees and higher earnings,
we may focus on the long-term over a decade or more. In addition, changes in short-
run income inequality may show the effects of business cycle related labor supply
and demand shocks, while changes in long-run inequality may result from shifts in
the adoption of technology (Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998). This chapter only
considers incomes over five and eleven-year periods, but the next chapter considers
up to thirty-one year periods.
2.4 Income Tax Panels: 1979-1990 & 1999-2009
This study compares income variability and inequality in two panels of tax returns:
the Continuous Work History Sample (CWHS) and the 1999 Individual Income Tax
Return Edited Panel. The CWHS is a panel that tracks data on tax filers between
1979 and 1990. The panel is embedded in IRS public-use tax return micro-files
for individual years and chosen randomly based on four-digit endings of primary
taxpayers’ Social Security numbers. By following Social Security numbers, marriages
and divorces cause some secondary taxpayers to enter or leave the sample. Burman
et al. (2010, p. 4) write that “non-random attrition behavior in the CWHS panel
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mirrors the attrition in the universe, and cannot be characterized as bias or error.”
Christian and Frischmann (1989) and Congressional Budget Office (2005) show low
rates of attrition and Weber (2005) discusses the gender bias that can result from
following primary filers, as men are listed as the primary taxpayer on over 95 percent
of joint returns.
Although the CWHS tax return dataset has comprehensive information on
income received and taxes paid, it only includes tax unit and not individual level in-
comes. While defining a consistent sample of individuals over many years is relatively
straightforward, defining a consistent sample of tax units is not as easy to accomplish
due to tax units uniting and splitting over time. As this tax return panel does not
allow the tracking of individuals, tax units are the unit of observation and are not
adjusted for marriage or divorce. To make comparisons with tax unit based inequal-
ity studies, such as Piketty and Saez (2003), this seems like the appropriate approach.
Some observations in the CWHS are sampled every year and others at less
frequent intervals. To limit issues arising from taxpayers entering and exiting the
sample due to sampling, I restrict the sample to tax units that were planned to
be sampled every year of the panel. Hence, sampling is based on a single Social
Security number last four digit combination, or a 0.01 percent sample consisting
of 16,000 observations. I then drop a tax unit’s earnings if they had no earnings
throughout the entire panel and in years when the primary filer or both filers
claimed age exemptions (at least 65 years old) and the tax unit had reported no
earnings for at least two subsequent years. Finally, I drop dependents in the year
they filed as dependents and all previous years. This restriction is only available
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beginning in 1987, but before that far fewer dependents were required to file tax
returns.2 These restrictions create the “non-retired sample”, the base sample used
for this chapter, with the exception of the Piketty and Saez replications in the next
section. Tax unit earnings are present for 8,495 tax units at the beginning of the
sample and 9,978 at the end, with tax units filing an average of seven and a half years.
The CWHS is representative, so no weights are assigned to observations. Fig-
ure 2.1 shows that adjusted gross income (AGI) percentile cutoffs for the CWHS
overlap with cutoffs for all tax returns. As expected, cutoffs are slightly higher for
years when more dependents are dropped from the CWHS but included in the IRS
data (see Table A1 for percentile cutoffs and cutoff ratios).
A number of other restrictions are made to limit the sample to tax units with at
least minimal labor force attachment and consistently in the panel. When including
years with incomes or earnings of zero, I follow a method similar to Kopczuk, Saez
and Song (2010) by dropping tax units for a given year when their average earnings
throughout a multi-year period falls below a threshold of about a quarter of the
minimum wage ($2,575 in 2004 and indexed with average earnings). I focus on tax
units that are present throughout five-year periods. This drops tax units from the
“non-retired sample” filing sporadically, leaving the five-year sample in 1981 with
6,067 tax units and in 1988 with 6,459 tax units. The same restrictions are used to
2Before 1987, dependents could claim an exclusion on both their own and their parents’ tax
return, meaning far fewer dependents filed their own returns. Gould (1987, p. 1) wrote at the time,
“Under the old law, you needed $1,080 of investment income or $3,560 of gross income before you
had to file a tax return. Now, dependent children with gross income that exceeds the standard
deduction of $2,540 in 1987 ($3,000 in 1988) or who have more than $500 of investment income must
file a Form 1040—even if they ultimately owe no tax.” Dependents make up a constant 9 percent of
the five-year sample.
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Figure 2.1 : Adjusted gross income percentile cutoffs of tax units ($2010, CPI-U-RS)
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make a “non-retired sample” for the Edited Panel.
The Edited Panel—also called the High Income Cohort or the Sales of Capital
Assets panel sample—is a sample of tax returns. The sample begins with 83,434 tax
returns in 1999 and follows all individuals listed as taxpayers on these returns until
2009. The base year of the panel oversamples top earners, including about 10,000
tax returns in the top one percent of the earnings distribution (Splinter, Bryant
and Diamond, 2009) and all tax units with incomes over $5 million (Weber and
Bryant, 2005). This oversampling allows income variability estimates even for the
top one-hundredth of one percent of the distribution.
The Edited Panel is a stratified random sample, with original stratum bound-
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aries set in the base year. This may lead to estimation issues as some returns change
strata. For example, tax units starting in low strata—with high base weights due to
low sampling rates—can move into higher strata and become over-represented. To
address this issue, weights of these stratum changers are trimmed.
Unlike the CWHS, which allows many new tax filers to enter the sample, the
Edited Panel follows the same set of taxpayers and so suffers from more problematic
attrition. While in the CWHS attrition should generally mirror changes in the
population of filers, attrition may bias the Edited Panel, which represents 100
percent of tax returns in 1999 but only 78 percent in 2005. Bryant (2008) estimates
that about a third of missing filers were intermittent filers. Of the other missing
filers, deaths explain about a third and gross incomes falling below the threshold
needed to file a return explain the other two-thirds. The threshold for being required
to file was about $11,000 in 1985 and $18,300 in 2004 for joint filers (2010 dollars).
As low incomes were relatively stagnant in this period, the growing threshold means
there could be more missing returns due to low incomes in the Edited Panel than
the CWHS. Also, a growing fraction of single filers—whose threshold was about half
of the joint filer threshold—may exacerbate attrition due to non-filers.
It is not clear how the large attrition of low income non-filers will affect in-
come variability estimates of the bottom of the distribution. Upwardly biased
variability would result if many non-filers had low variability incomes below the
threshold. Meanwhile, downwardly biased variability would result if many non-filers
had low income only that year and higher income in other years, as these incon-
sistent filers may be dropped from the samples in this study. The large amount
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of mean reversion found in the bottom quintile—where those at the bottom of the
distribution tend to have large gains in subsequent years—suggests that non-filing
may downwardly bias bottom quintile variability in the Edited Panel.
This study uses a number of income definitions, all of which are assigned to
tax units by filing period years to adjust for late returns and are indexed to
2010 dollars with the CPI-U-RS. Cash income includes wages, salaries, tips, net
capital gain or loss (unless otherwise specified),3 taxable and tax-exempt interest,
dividend income, net income from business (sole proprietorships, partnerships,
and S corporations), farm income, net rental income, royalty income, taxable and
non–taxable pension and annuity income, net alimony received/paid, unemployment
compensation, state income tax refunds and other income in AGI except for Social
Security benefits, as they were unavailable for some years. Cash income is similar
to the income definition used by Piketty and Saez (2003), although it includes
unemployment benefits and excludes employee payroll taxes. It is also similar to the
definition used by Auten and Gee (2009), although it excludes Social Security benefits.
After-tax cash income subtracts federal taxes paid from cash income and adds
earned income credits. Income is the Piketty and Saez (2003) gross income def-
inition, set in the CWHS by adding the employee component of payroll taxes (as
estimated by earnings) to cash income and excluding capital gains and set in the
Edited Panel by adding the employee component of payroll taxes to AGI minus
capital gains, minus Social Security and unemployment insurance in AGI, and plus
3Due to the 60 percent exclusion of long-term capital gains between 1979 and 1986, net capital
gains reported on tax returns are multiplied by 2.5 for those years.
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adjustments. Earnings are total wages, salaries, and tips reported on tax forms.
2.5 Top One Percent Income Concentration:
Replicating Piketty and Saez (2003)
As increasing top one percent income concentration caused almost all of the
increasing inequality in the 1980s and much of the increase since, I match Piketty
and Saez (2003, hereafter PS) top income shares and show how five and eleven-year
average income shares differ from annual shares. I find that there was little income
variability in the top one percent in the early 1980s and somewhat more in the early
2000s, and that most of this increase in variability seems caused by the top tenth of
one percent. A jump in top income variability immediately followed the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 (TRA86) and this increased variability persisted into the 2000s. At the
end of this chapter, I present evidence of increased pass-through income going to top
earners, which may explain both the timing of the variability shock and its persistence.
To make a comparable dataset to PS, I make two changes to the “non-retired” CWHS.
I add retirees back to the sample and add the fraction of non-filing tax units to the
sample estimated by PS. The latter is done with a single observation with zero income
throughout the sample and a weight equivalent to the missing number of tax units,
usually about eight hundred. To make the Edited Panel comparable to PS, I remove
dependents and add non-filers in the same way. Figure 2.2 (left figure) compares top
one percent income shares from the CWHS and the Edited Panel with values from
PS. Although the CWHS sample has a similar top one percent share until 1987, it
shows less income concentration in the last three years of the sample. Meanwhile, the
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Edited Panel top income share falls as sample attrition grows over time. To account
for differences between the datasets, I match top one percent annual income shares
of PS with the CWHS and Edited Panel five-year sample by adjusting the weight of
the observation with zero income throughout the sample (Figure 2.2, right figure).
Similarly, I match top tenth and hundredth of one percent income shares (Figure A3).
Figure 2.2 : Comparison of top one percent annual income shares for Piketty and
Saez and two tax panels
  
7%
10%
13%
16%
19%
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010T
o
p
 1
%
 In
co
m
e 
Sh
ar
e 
(n
o
 c
ap
it
al
 g
ai
n
s)
 
Raw Data 
PS CWHS Edited Panel
7%
10%
13%
16%
19%
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Five-Year Income PS Match 
PS CWHS  Edited Panel
Note: To make data comparable with Piketty and Saez (values from updates on website of Emmanuel
Saez), in the left figure the fraction of non-filing tax units used by Piketty and Saez were added to
the sample. In the right figure, the number of zero earners added to the CWHS and Edited Panel
was adjusted so that the annual shares of the five-year sample match PS shares. Dependents are
dropped from both tax panels. Income for the CWHS is cash income (excluding capital gains) plus
the employee component of payroll taxes (up to the taxable amount of earnings). Income in the Edited
Panel is AGI minus capital gains and transfers in AGI (taxable Social Security and unemployment
compensation) plus exemptions and employee payroll taxes. Source: Piketty and Saez (2003, updated
2010 and 2012).
This matched sample can be used to compare annual and five-year income shares.
Figure 2.3 shows that there was little income variability in the top one percent from
1982 to 1986, as there was little gap between the annual and five-year income shares.
Immediately following TRA86, top one percent income variability began to increase,
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and this higher level of variability persisted since the reform. Variability in the
2000s is seen not only for the top one and tenth of one percent, but also for the top
one-hundredth of one percent in the 2000s (Figure A4).
Figure 2.3 : Top 1% and 0.1% income shares (no capital gains)
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For the CWHS top 0.1 percent after 1981, there are 15 observations or more. Source: Piketty and
Saez (2003, updated 2010 and 2012).
To estimate the growth of income top income concentrations caused by variability, I
need to compare starting and ending periods. In order to compare periods in similar
parts of the business cycle, I consider two four-year periods beginning a year after
the end of recessions: 1983 to 1986 and 2002 to 2005.
Table 2.2 shows that the top ten percent income share increased 8 percentage
points (from 35 to 43 percent), but that the five-year share only increased 7 percent-
age points (from 34 to 41 percent). This implies a growing gap between annual and
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five-year shares and so also increased variability. The final column is obtained with
Equation 2.3 by dividing the increase in inequality due to variability by the annual
inequality increase. It shows that 12 percent of the increase in annual top ten percent
shares was caused by variability. Similarly, annual top one percent shares grew 7
percentage points but five-year shares only 6 percentage points, and about a tenth
of the increase in annual top one percent income shares was caused by variability.
These results hold for smoothed annual shares (panel A) and non-smoothed annual
shares (panel B).
Table 2.2 also shows that income variability increases in the 2000s as one
moves to the very top of the distribution. In fact, the top tenth of each group seems
to contain over half of each group’s variability. The gap between top one percent
smoothed annual and five-year average income shares is 0.9 percent (15.9 vs. 15.0
percent), for the top tenth of one percent the gap is 0.5 percent (6.6 vs. 6.1 percent),
and for the top hundredth of one percent the gap is 0.4 percent (2.8 vs. 2.4 percent).
This suggests that while increasing income concentrations became more extreme as
one moves up the top of the distribution, the increasing variability may have also
been more extreme at the very top of the distribution.
Income variability seems to have a larger impact over longer periods of time than
five years. Table 2.3 shows that eleven-year variability explains a fifth of increasing
top one percent income shares. Panel A shows that between 1984 and 2004, top
one percent income variability increased from -5 to 7 percent, explaining 22 percent
of the increase in the top one percent share.4 Panel B considers 1985 as the initial
4To see an example of negative variability—i.e., multi-year income shares above annual shares—
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year and finds that variability caused a third of the increase in top shares. An issue
with these results is that annual earnings were not smoothed. Using PS values
and smoothing annual shares over eleven years, the fraction of increasing top one
percent shares due to variability in panel A falls to 19 percent and in panel B falls
to 26 percent (not shown). Relative to eleven years, longer periods of twenty or
thirty years may not show much of an increase in variability at the bottom of the
distribution (see chapter 3) but may show much more variability at the top of the
distribution. This could happen if in each business cycle top earners are a different
set of people; for example, those working or investing in technology and internet
sectors in the 1990s and real estate in the early 2000s. Unfortunately, these panels
do not allow estimates of income variability over longer periods of time.
So far, we have only considered top income shares. Variability in other parts
of the distribution may have an effect on measures of annual income dispersion.
Table 2.4 uses income shares to show that the bottom and top of the distribution
were both sources of increasing variability. Note that top shares are not matched in
this analysis, as this would bias the bottom of the distribution. The bottom quintile
clearly had the largest initial level of variability and the largest growth in variability,
going from 29 to 45 percent.
Increasing inequality was caused by changes throughout the income distribu-
tion. The bottom quintile income share dropped by a third, from 3.7 to 2.4 percent,
in Table 2.1 switch the income of A and C in year 1 and then reduce A’s income in year 2 from 11
to 6. The three-year average share is still 14%, but the smoothed annual share in year 2 falls to
13.7%, implying income variability of about -5 percent.
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contributing to the overall inequality increase. Stagnant earnings variability in the
top half of the distribution excluding the top one percent (P60-P99) may slightly
mitigate the effect of bottom quintile and top one percent variability on increasing
inequality. Looking at the entire distribution, it seems that the bottom quintile
and top ten percent each caused about half of the overall inequality increase from
variability.5 This resulted from the bottom quintile having a large increase in
variability and modest inequality increase, and the top one percent having a modest
increase in variability and large inequality increase.
2.6 Cash Income and After-Tax Income Variability
Whereas the previous section considered the effect of income variability on increasing
inequality using income shares, this section considers the same question using sum-
mary statistics of income dispersion. Table 2.5 presents three classes of dispersion
measures. For the first two classes—generalized entropy measures and Atkinson
indices—measures go from emphasizing a lower to a higher part of the distribution.
For example, mean logarithmic deviation (MLD) and the Atkinson index with an
inequality aversion of ε=0.75 emphasize the bottom of the distribution, while the
Theil Index and Atkinson index with ε=0.25 emphasize the top of the distribution.6
Two trends are seen for the first two classes of dispersion measures. First, the
fraction of annual inequality explained by five-year variability tends to be higher for
5Note that the bottom quintile and the top ten percent each caused income share changes due
to variability of about 0.5 percent (Table 2.4, column 8).
6MLD is calculated as in Jones and Weinberg (2000). See appendix A for generalized entropy
measure equations. Following the U.S. Census method for MLD, I replace zero and negative earnings
values with $1 for all generalized entropy measures (MLD, symmetric Theil, Theil, and Atkinson
indices). The symmetric Theil index is an average of the MLD and Theil index. See Maasoumi and
Zandvakili (1990) for a discussion of generalized entropy measures and their application to measuring
income mobility.
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measures emphasizing the bottom of the distribution. Second, income variability
levels changed little between the early 1980s and 2000s, although cash income
variability fell slightly (panel A) and after-tax income variability increased slightly
(panel B). These trends mean that variability only explains about a tenth of the
increase in annual cash income inequality, while variability explains up to a quarter
of increasing after-tax cash income inequality. Table A2 shows similar results for
eleven-year income variability.
Table 2.5 : Smoothed annual income inequality increase and fraction explained by
five-year variability
Fraction Annual Annual Annual Percentage Fraction Annual
Inequality Inequality Inequality Annual Inequality
from Variability Increase due Increase Inequality Increase
1983-86 2002-05 to Variability Increase from Variability
Panel A: Cash Income
Mean Log Deviation 24% 22% 0.0137 0.0914 23% 15%
Symmetric Theil 18% 17% 0.0220 0.1525 39% 14%
Theil Index 12% 11% 0.0203 0.2034 53% 10%
Atkinson (ε=0.75) 13% 12% 0.0040 0.0570 24% 7%
Atkinson (ε=0.50) 10% 9% 0.0038 0.0498 31% 8%
Atkinson (ε=0.25) 7% 7% 0.0020 0.0333 40% 6%
Gini Coefficient 6% 6% 0.0076 0.0623 14% 12%
Panel B: After-Tax Cash Income
Mean Log Deviation 26% 26% 0.0212 0.0812 23% 26%
Symmetric Theil 20% 21% 0.0298 0.1250 36% 24%
Theil Index 13% 14% 0.0227 0.1532 45% 15%
Atkinson (ε=0.75) 14% 13% 0.0052 0.0466 22% 11%
Atkinson (ε=0.50) 10% 10% 0.0032 0.0381 27% 8%
Atkinson (ε=0.25) 7% 6% 0.0004 0.0234 32% 2%
Gini Coefficient 6% 8% 0.0125 0.0577 14% 22%
Note: Five-year average incomes are centered and annual incomes are smoothed using t-2 to t+2.
Only tax units in the CWHS or Edited Panel “non-retired samples” all five years of each five-year
period are included in annual and multi-year samples ($2010, CPI-U-RS). Annual and five-year mea-
sures only include tax units with average earnings throughout the five-year period above the threshold
($2,575 in 2004 and indexed with average earnings).
Tax units with self-employment income contributed disproportionately to increasing
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variability. While tax units with any self-employment income throughout the sample
make up only a fifth of the sample, they caused much of the increase in inequality
explained by five-year cash income variability in the 1980s. Self-employment
income is three times more variable than earnings.7 A large fraction of those with
self-employment income are at the low and high extremes of the distribution, which
fits with the observation that income variability is also highest at these extremes.
Before making an in-depth analysis of earnings variability in the next section,
I briefly compare the absolute variability of cash income and earnings. Figure 2.4
shows that relative to cash income variability, earnings variability is higher for the
bottom nine deciles, with almost twice as much absolute variability in the bottom
four deciles. 8 Cash income variability is lower than earnings variability because it
includes relatively consistent income streams—such as interest, dividends, rental,
pension and annuity income—as well as sources of income that can offset negative
shocks—such as unemployment compensation. After-tax cash income variability
levels looks similar to cash income variability across the distribution. The much
higher level of absolute variability for earnings foreshadows the large impact of
variability on earnings inequality seen in the next section.
7The average variability of self-employment income over the CWHS panel is three times that of
earnings when measured by variance of five-year arc percentage changes: 2.8 vs. 0.8.
8I measure absolute variability with the dispersion of arc percentage earnings changes within
each earnings group, as doing so removes year effects and relates closely to inequality. For example,
if all earnings increase by the same percentage, then the variance is zero and inequality should also
be unaffected. Arc percentage changes also allow the inclusion of movements from zero to positive
earnings, as it equals 2 · (xfinal − xinitial)/(xfinal + xinitial) (Congressional Budget Office, 2008b).
Note that for non–negative values arc percentages are bounded by negative and positive two, which
result from tax units moving to or from zero earnings, and that relative to normal percentages this
understates large gains and overstates large losses.
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Figure 2.4 : Tax unit absolute variability by earnings group, 1986-1990
 
Note: Variance of five-year (t to t+4) arc percentage changes in annual tax unit earnings including
zeros. Earnings groups over 1986-1990 set by total earnings over the five-year period. CWHS “non-
retired sample” sample. ($2010, CPI-U-RS)
2.7 The Effect of Earnings Variability on Annual Inequality
Compared to the more comprehensive measures of income seen in the last sec-
tion, earnings variability seems to explain more of increasing earnings inequality.
Earnings variability explains about a third of the increase of annual earnings
inequality between the early 1980s and 2000s, although this ranges from half for
the MLD, a fifth for the Theil Index, and a tenth for the Gini coefficient (Table
2.6). As the fraction of annual earnings inequality explained by five-year variability
is highest for the MLD, this suggests more variability at the bottom of the dis-
tribution. Table A2, panel C shows similar results for eleven-year earnings variability.
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Including tax units in the sample who reported negative or zero earnings re-
sults in different inequality and variability trends. Table A3, panel A shows that
annual inequality decreased for the bottom of the distribution (MLD and Atkinson,
ε=0.75) and increased for the top (Theil index and Atkinson, ε=0.25). Falling
earnings variability actually seems to explain more than all of the decrease in
annual inequality in the bottom of the distribution. This is because the five-year
MLD actually increased from 0.309 to 0.320 (while the annual MLD decreased from
0.578 to 0.423), which basically means that without decreasing variability, annual
inequality would have increased. This decrease in inequality was partly caused by a
decreasing fraction of consistently filing tax units with zero earnings from 2.4 to 1.7
percent between the early 1980s and 2000s. In contrast, there is a negligible fraction
of tax units with zero cash income so including or excluding zero incomes has a small
impact on income inequality and variability trends. Table A3, panel B shows similar
results for eleven-year earnings variability.
I discuss this divergence of earnings dispersions and earnings variability across
the bottom and top of the distribution in Chapter 3, where I find similar results for
the individual earnings distribution. I now consider some of the forces driving the
high level of earnings variability at the ends of the distribution.
2.7.1 Earnings Variability across the Distribution
Earnings variability changes significantly over the earnings distribution. In fact,
high variability in the bottom quintile and increasing variability in the top one
percent seem to drive almost all of variability’s effect on increasing inequality. Mean
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Table 2.6 : Smoothed annual earnings inequality and inequality increase from tax
unit five-year earnings variability
Fraction Annual Annual Annual Percentage Fraction Annual
Inequality Inequality Inequality Annual Inequality
from Variability Increase due Increase Inequality Increase
1983-86 2002-05 to Variability Increase from Variability
Mean Log Deviation 15% 25% 0.0560 0.1024 31% 55%
Symmetric Theil 12% 19% 0.0476 0.1453 46% 33%
Theil Index 9% 13% 0.0365 0.1856 62% 20%
Atkinson (ε=0.75) 11% 16% 0.0185 0.0550 26% 34%
Atkinson (ε=0.50) 10% 15% 0.0139 0.0483 34% 29%
Atkinson (ε=0.25) 9% 16% 0.0112 0.0359 50% 31%
Gini Coefficient 4% 4% 0.0043 0.0436 11% 10%
Note: Five-year average earnings are centered and annual earnings are smoothed using t-2 to
t+2 earnings, and these are averaged over each four year period (1983-86 and 2002-05) before
calculating other values. Only tax units in the CWHS and Edited Panel “non-retired samples”
with positive earnings all five years of each five-year period are included in annual and multi-year
samples ($2010, CPI-U-RS).
reversion causes this variability with large earnings increases at the bottom of the
distribution and large losses at the top.
Absolute earnings variability was largest at the extremes of the distribution in
the late 1980s, with the bottom two quintiles and top one percent having the
highest variability (Figure 2.5). Comparing earnings variability in the early and late
1980s shows that variability remained constant across the distribution, except for
increasing variability in the top one percent.
Variability may differ systematically for different types of workers. As mentioned,
tax filers with any self-employment income have almost twice as much earnings
variability throughout most of the distribution (Figure A1).
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Figure 2.5 : Tax unit absolute earnings variability over the distribution
 
Note: Variance of five-year (t to t+4) arc percentage changes in annual tax unit earnings including
zeros. Earnings groups set by total earnings over each period. CWHS “non-retired sample” sample.
($2010, CPI-U-RS)
Variability may also differ systematically for different types of filers. Auten
and Gee (2009) use a panel of tax returns between 1987 and 2005 to find correlates
with relative income mobility. When not adjusting for family size, as in this study
and Piketty and Saez (2003), they estimate that getting married is associated with
rising a third of the way up the distribution and that divorce or widowhood is
associated with falling about a quarter of the way down the distribution. In the
CWHS, the correlation between filing status and earnings variability varies over
the distribution. The left side of Figure A2 shows that earnings variability is much
higher for tax units in the second and third deciles if they are initially married
rather than single. To see the effect of divorces and marriages, the right side of
Figure A2 shows that variability is higher for constantly married filers at the bottom
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of the distribution while higher for those who marry or divorce in the top half
of the distribution. Frequent movements in and out of employment by secondary
earners may explain the high variability of married households at the bottom of the
distribution, while higher labor force attachment of secondary earners in the top
of the distribution may cause low variability for constantly married, high earnings
households.
Directional earnings changes show how variability equalizes earnings. Tax units that
started in the bottom of the distribution in 1980 had the largest earnings increases,
and as tax units move up the distribution, they tend to have smaller gains and then
larger losses. Specifically, earnings increased for those in the bottom two quintiles in
1980 and decreased for the top two quintiles. These effects become stronger when
following a tax unit over more years. Figure 2.6 shows that between 1980 and 1990,
tax units starting in the bottom quintile more than doubled their earnings while
those starting in the top quarter percent had earnings 90 arc percent lower (this
corresponds to about 60 percent lower).
Gains at the bottom of the distribution and losses at the top are caused in part
by reversions to the mean: a negative shock can temporarily push a family into a
lower earnings group, while a positive shock can temporarily inflate the earnings of a
family at the top of the distribution. For example, the first quintile lost an average
of 31 arc percent between 1979 and 1980 before gaining 37 arc percent the following
year, and the top one percent gained an average of 14 arc percent before losing 13 arc
percent. Thus it seems that much of variability at the extremes of the distribution
is caused by transitory mean-reverting earnings changes. Similarly, de Fontenay,
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Figure 2.6 : Mean Reversion: mean directional earnings changes since 1980 by earn-
ings group
 
Note: Mean arc percentage changes in annual tax unit earnings for 1-year from 1980 to 1981, 4-year
from 1980 to 1984, and 10-year from 1980 to 1990. Earnings groups are for 1980 annual earnings.
CWHS “non-retired sample” sample includes zero earnings. ($2010, CPI-U-RS)
Gorgens and Liu (2002) estimate that increased short-term upward mobility for low
earners offset decreased earnings in the 1970s.
To verify that mean reversion does explain earnings variability at the ends of
the distribution, Figure 2.7 shows correlations of two consecutive annual earnings
earnings changes by earnings groups. The negative correlations at the ends of the
distribution result from mean reversion: earnings decreases are followed by increases
in the bottom four deciles, and earnings increases are followed by decreases in the
top two deciles. Meanwhile, earnings changes are relatively uncorrelated in the
upper-middle part of the distribution.
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Figure 2.7 : Mean Reversion: mean correlation of earnings changes by earnings group
by earnings group (1980-1989)
   
Note: Correlation of arc percentage changes of annual tax unit earnings (t-1 to t and t to t+1).
Mean for t=1980 to 1989 is shown. Earnings groups are for annual earnings at time t. CWHS
“non-retired sample” sample. ($2010, CPI-U-RS)
2.8 Why did Top One Percent Income Variability Increase?
I discuss three explanations for increasing variability in the top one percent of
the distribution: tax-shifting, skill-biased technological change, and industry de-
cartelization. The tax-shifting argument explains that by lowering the top individual
tax rate below the corporate tax rate, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86)
motivated many corporations to switch from filing as C to S-corporations, causing
some corporate income to be passed through directly to individuals (Feenberg
and Poterba, 1993; Slemrod, 1996; Auten and Carroll, 1999; Gordon and Slemrod,
2000). This tax-shifting response can also occur with shifts from corporations
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to sole proprietorships and partnerships (Goolsbee, 2002).9 Note, that the evi-
dence for increasing annual inequality is usually based on measures of personal
income, so shifts from corporate to pass-through (i.e., personal) income increase
both annual inequality and income variability. This occurs because business in-
come tends to go to the top of the personal income distribution and is more variable.10
The skill-biased technological change argument is put forward by Parker and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2010). They show that before the 1980s, top one percent income
shares were slightly less cyclical than that of the average household, but since then
they have been almost two and a half times more cyclical. This correlation of
increased top income shares and cyclicality is seen across recent decades, subgroups
within the top one percent (such as the top 0.1 percent) and countries. Parker and
Vissing-Jorgensen propose that information and communication technologies could
have increased the optimal production scale of the most talented and argue that this
also increases top income fluctuations by making them more vulnerable to business
cycles. Interestingly, some top income households may not smooth all of these
income shocks, as Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) and Frank (2011) provide
evidence of increasing top income consumption cyclicality.
9“[T]he relative taxation of corporate to personal income plays an important role in the share
of firms, employment and sales that are done by corporations versus partnerships and sole propri-
etorships. An increase in the [state] corporate tax rate by .10 reduces the corporate share of firms
by 5-10 percent...” (Goolsbee, 2002, p. 17)
10The average variability of net business income (Schedule C, partnership, and S-corporation)
over the CWHS panel is two hundred times more volatile than earnings when measured by variance
of annual arc percentage changes: 98.9 to 0.4 for one year changes and 142.8 to 0.8 for five year
changes. Over the CWHS panel, the top ten percent of the annual cash income distribution receives
an average of 62 percent of net business income.
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Alternatively, Rajan and Zingales (2003) observe that in the first half of the
twentieth century industries consolidated into vertically integrated firms with
sufficient power in labor markets to compress wage differentials. As innovation (they
emphasize financial innovation) decreased barriers to entry for new firms in the
1970s, skilled workers found increasing demand for their labor. This allowed them
to free their human capital from specific firms and demand higher wages relative to
lower skilled workers. While this may have caused more income dispersion over the
entire distribution, its effects may have been concentrated among top earners. Rajan
and Zingales suggest that the decartelization process was caused by increased access
to capital, resulting in more new business owners and an increased scale of operation
for financial sector workers (such as hedge fund managers). The resulting increase in
risk-taking by top income workers could help explain increasing top earner variability.
This narrative fits with this chapter’s findings that those with self-employment
earnings had much larger increases in variability and with Bakija, Cole and Heim
(2010), who show that the top one percent contains many self-employed, executives
and financial sector workers with incentive pay and highly variable earnings.
2.8.1 Income Shifting and Top One Percent Shares Over the Long Run
As income shifting seems to have contributed to the growth in income variability, I
discuss the basic mechanics and history of shifting among top income households.
Jonathan Gruber outlines three kinds of reactions people can have to taxes (Gerber,
2012, p. 1)
There are timing reactions like, “Should I realise my capital gains today or tomorrow?”
There are financing reactions like, “Should I get paid in stock options or wages?” And
then there are behaviour adjustments like, “How hard should I work?”
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The income shifting between C-corporations and pass-through entities discussed
here is a financing reaction to tax reform, but this shifting can also affect income
variability through implicit timing effects. When a business is organized as a
C-corporation, then net income is either distributed as dividends or held as retained
earnings and eventually shows up as personal income in the form of capital gains
realizations. Dividend payments tend to have low variability from year to year.
Income variability is also low if the owner of a closely held C-corporation plans on
passing on their business to a family member, because then they have an incentive to
never realize capital gains due to step up in basis at death. In contrast, pass-through
income cannot be accumulated as retained earnings in the same way, leading to more
volatile distributions.
A brief description of income shifting since the 1980s gives a picture of the
connection between shifting and top income shares. Appendix A describes shifting
before the 1980s. Piketty and Saez (2003) estimate that the top one percent income
share increased from an average of 8 to 13 percent in the decades before and after
the Tax Reform of 1986; but almost all of this two decade change occurred in
the two years following the reform. Figure 2.8 shows that business pass-through
income contributed to the large increase in the top one percent income share. A
jump in wages also occurred in the two years following TRA86—in fact, the four
percentage point increase in top one percent income share between 1986 and 1988 is
explained by a two percentage point jump in both business pass-through income and
wages. The interpretation of “reasonable compensation”, which limits the fraction
of income that can be taken as tax-preferred pass-through income, explains the
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simultaneous jump in pass-through income and wages.11 To ensure that wages are
more than distributions, accountants suggest that business owners follow the 60/40
rule-of-thumb; that is, business owners take 60 percent of net business income as
wages (salary) and 40 percent as pass-through income (distributions). It is clear that
by reducing top personal tax rates far below the corporate tax rate (Figure A5),
TRA86 created an incentive for some business owners to shift their business income
from corporate to pass-through form.
Figure 2.8 : Top 1% income share (no capital gains)
   
Notes: Business pass-through income includes profits from S-corporations, partnerships, sole pro-
prietorships (Schedule C), and farm income. Wages includes wages, salaries, pensions, bonuses,
and exercised stock-options. Total income includes the sources shown, interest, and rents. Source:
Piketty and Saez (2003).
11Pass-through income is not subject to payroll taxes, in particular, the uncapped Medicare
portion, while wage income is subject to payroll taxes.
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Since 1990, incentive pay seems to have caused top income shares to fluctuate with
business cycles,12 but pass-through income also continuously grew. The top one
percent income share from business pass-through income increased one percentage
point between 1991 and 1996 and another percentage point between 2003 and 2005
(Figure 2.8). The increase in the 1990s happened despite the 1993 increase in the top
personal tax rate from 31 to 39.6 percent. Other factors mitigated the effect of this
tax increase. The top bracket only included a fraction of the top of the distribution
(those in the top 0.5 percent) and strong economic growth resulted in growing business
profits. In addition, there is a lock-in effect because businesses who switch from filing
as S-corporation to C-corporations must wait five years before they can again file
as S-corporations. The increase in top one percent income share from pass-through
income in the 2000s immediately followed the 2003 tax reform. While this reform’s
decrease in dividends and capital gains tax rates lessened the double tax burden on
C-corporations, the decrease in top personal tax rates to 35 percent lessened the tax
burden for pass-through income.
2.9 Conclusion
Earnings variability means that measures of annual earnings inequality can be larger
than measures of inequality defined over a longer-run period. Increasing tax unit
income variability caused up to a fifth of the increase in top one percent income
shares since the early 1980s. These results suggest that annual top income shares
since 1986 overstate top income shares relative to a multi-year perspective. This
12Desai (2012) notes that the equity based share of senior management compensation increased
between 1990 and 2007 from 20 to 70 percent. Stock options usually show up as wage income, hence
the strong cyclicality of top wages over the last two decades. Including capital gains exacerbates the
cyclicality of top income shares seen in Figure 2.8 over this period.
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is because the large gains pushing tax units to the very top of the distribution are
often followed by large losses.
Top one percent income variability increases were pronounced in the years fol-
lowing the 1986 tax reform. Permanent income shifting in response to tax reform
seems to have caused a significant fraction of both increasing inequality and variabil-
ity. This suggests that future tax reforms may lead to income shifting and changing
income variability at the top of the distribution. For example, proposed increases
in top personal tax rates and decreases in corporate tax rates could lead to shifting
out of pass-through entities. This would decrease measured annual top income
concentration, reinforced by a decrease in income variability, but will likely have
little effect on these households’ consumption potential. This highlights the problem
with using annual income concentrations as a proxy for consumption inequality.
Increasing income variability may also have real economic effects. The top
five percent of the distribution now accounts for 60 percent of income taxes paid
and 35 percent of consumption (Frank, 2011). This means variability at the top of
the distribution can exaggerate cyclicality in tax revenues and perhaps even overall
macroeconomic cyclicality. These macroeconomic spillovers may cause significant
stress for others less able to smooth negative shocks.
While mean reversion of income implies top earner gains are followed by losses,
at the bottom of the income distribution it implies losses are followed by gains.
Growing income variability at the bottom of the distribution also appears to have
contributed to growing annual inequality. A concern is that the heavy attrition
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of non-filers due to incomes low enough to not have to file a tax return may bias
results for the bottom quintile. Comparisons with the PSID, which covers non-filers,
could help address this concern. Also, individual earnings data seem to confirm the
important impact of variability in the bottom half of the distribution, as seen in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Individual Income Variability and Inequality:
Social Security Administration Data, 1951-2006
3.1 Introduction
U.S. individual earnings inequality has increased since the mid-1960s (Kopczuk, Saez
and Song, 2010, KSS). Skill-biased technical change may explain slower earnings
growth in the middle of the distribution and faster growth at the top because of
dispersion of hourly wages (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993). In addition to growing
dispersion between the bottom and top halves of the distribution, there has been
growing dispersion within parts the distribution. KSS find growing inequality in the
bottom half of the individual distribution, with the log(P50/P20) ratio increasing
a third between 1970 and the mid-1980s. Using Social Security Administration
individual earnings data for the bottom of the distribution, I find that increasing
variability explains most of the increase in annual earnings inequality in the 1970s
and early 1980s.
As discussed in chapter 2, variability tends to equalize annual earnings over
multi-year periods. This means earnings averaged over a number of years will have
lower inequality than annual earnings inequalities, and when the gap between multi-
year and annual inequalities widens, then variability has increased and caused annual
inequality to be higher. As earnings inequality is often measured by the variance of
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log earnings, years of zero earnings are often dropped in other studies. Gottschalk
and Moffitt (2009) follow this approach with the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and estimate that about half of the increase in annual male earnings
inequality from 1974 to 1990 was caused by increasing instability. When following
this restriction by dropping workers with years of zero earnings, I also find that
about half of the increase in annual inequality in this period was caused by variability.
By removing observations with any zero earnings in multi-year periods, many
studies do not address these movements in and out of employment. I find that
this has a large effect on individual earnings variability. In fact, including years of
zero earnings shows that for the bottom half of the earnings distribution, increasing
variability explains all of the increase in individual earnings inequality.
I extend previous research on individual earnings in a number of other ways.
Whereas the standard measure of variance of log earnings means women’s earnings
are ignored because of the high frequency of zero annual earnings, I retain women
in the sample by using a number of alternative dispersion measures. A further
contribution is that rather than providing estimates based on survey data from a
few thousand workers, I use two administrative panels each with about a quarter
million men and women beginning almost two decades before the PSID. In fact,
these appear to be the longest public-use panels of U.S. earnings available and allow
me to measure earnings variability over workers’ entire lifetimes. This is important
because it shows how variability increases with the number of years over which
earnings are averaged.
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In the most comparable study to this one, KSS find a small effect of earnings
variability on inequality when using Social Security data, excluding self-employment
earnings and workers with low-earnings for at least one year within a multi-year
period (below $2,575 in 2004), and estimating dispersion with Gini coefficients.
While my data appear similar to that used by KSS, I focus on the bottom half
of the distribution and find large fluctuations in this group’s earnings variability.
Other studies find that earnings variability at the bottom of the distribution seems
to contribute significantly to overall earnings variability. Sabelhaus and Song (2009)
find that adding the bottom ten percent of Social Security earnings records for
workers age 25 to 55 causes volatility to double. While Jensen and Shore (2008) find
that volatile incomes were much more likely in the PSID among the self-employed
and those self-identified as risk-tolerant. I also include self-employment earnings in
my sample, but it is not clear how much this makes my results differ from those of
KSS.
3.1.1 Variability and Inequality: Falling then Rising Together
This paper presents evidence that annual individual earnings inequality for the
bottom of the distribution has moved with variability over the long run: falling with
variability in the late 1950s and early 1960s and then rising in the 1970s and early
1980s. This suggests that the U-shaped inequality pattern over this three decade
period was partly caused by a fall and then a rise in variability.
The most significant inequality decrease occurred in the “Great Compression”
of the 1940s as high tax rates and wage controls coincided with sharp reductions in
top income shares (Piketty and Saez, 2004). Overall earnings inequality also fell in
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the 1940s, with the individual earnings Gini coefficient declining 16 percent (KSS).
This earnings compression continued at a slower pace in the 1950s, with the earnings
Gini coefficient falling another 6 percent, although this conceals rising inequality in
the top of the distribution. So while the “Great Compression” began with decreasing
top income shares, the effect of wartime taxes and wage controls seemed to reverse
in the 1950s as earnings concentration increased in the top half of the distribution.1
Without the earnings compression in the bottom half of the distribution—shown to
be largely driven by falling variability in this paper—overall inequality may have
fallen significantly less in the 1950s.
The U-shaped individual earnings variability trend between the 1950s and 1980s
raises two related questions: “Why was variability so low in the 1960s?” and “Why
did variability increase?” Low earnings variability appears to be explained by a small
fraction of working age men with years of zero earnings, which I refer to as low
movement in and out of employment by men. Similarly, increasing variability seems
explained by more movements in and out of employment by men. Cappellari and
Leonardi (2006) estimate that each year of job tenure reduces earnings instability
by 15 percent. As increased movement in and out of employment decreases tenure
length, we expect earnings instability and hence variability to increase. In the U.S.,
these effects seem driven by institutional changes leading to decreased worker-firm
attachment (Bhagwati and Dehejia, 1994; Farber, 2008) and were perhaps exacer-
bated by cohort effects resulting from the 1930s baby bust and post-war baby boom
(Macunovich, 2000).
1In the 1950s, bottom earnings inequality decreased by 13 percent and top earnings inequality
increased 7 percent, as measured by log(P50/P20) and log(P80/P50) estimates by KSS.
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3.1.2 Mixed Evidence for Increasing Individual Earnings Variability since
the mid-1980s
The period of the Great Moderation is distinguished by a period of lower macroe-
conomic volatility. While household income variability seems to have continued
increasing since the mid-1980s,2 individual earnings variability may have decreased
during the Great Moderation, although there is mixed evidence for individual
earnings variability trends. Sabelhaus and Song (2009, 2010) use Social Security
Administration data similar to that used in this study. They exclude zero earnings
from their sample and estimate falling annual volatility from 1985 to 2000. Con-
gressional Budget Office (2008b) uses similar data and also finds falling earnings
volatility, although they include zero earnings in their sample. This seems largely
due to a flattening of male earnings instability since 1990 (Gottschalk and Moffitt,
2009; Kopczuk, Saez and Song, 2010). Leonesio and Del Bene (2011) estimate Social
Security earnings averaged over two twelve-year periods between 1981 and 2004.
These estimates suggest that male variability increased slightly—similar to another
study including self-employment earnings (Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel, 2008)—but
that female earnings variability increased substantially since the 1980s.
A number of papers use the Longitudinal Employment and Household Dy-
namics (LEHD) panel, which covers nearly all U.S. workers since the mid-1990s.
Gottschalk, McEntarfer and Moffitt (2008) find relatively stable or slightly falling
male instability in the 1990s. Celik et al. (2009) use LEHD, CPS, and SIPP data
2Hertz (2007) finds increasing household income volatility since the mid-1980s with the Current
Population Survey. Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009) estimate that between 1990 and 2000 family
income instability increased about 40 percent.
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and find stable male instability in the 1990s and 2000s, except for a jump in 2001.
DeBacker et al. (2010) use a panel of tax returns from 1987 to 2006. They estimate
that about a third of male earnings inequality is transitory, but that this explains
little of increasing inequality.
Some studies may find falling variability and others flat variability because
patterns were different across the distribution. I find that decreasing inequality
in the bottom half of the distribution was largely caused by decreasing variability.
Meanwhile, inequality increased for the top of the distribution while their variability
remained flat. Hence permanent earnings, not variability, seemed to drive increasing
inequality for top earners.
Section 2 of this chapter introduces two Social Security Administration datasets.
Section 3 examines increasing individual earnings variability and inequality in
the bottom half of the distribution from 1973 to 1985 and falling variability and
inequality from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s. Section 4 discusses inequality and
variability changes between 1985 and 2000.
3.2 Social Security Administration Earnings Data
This study uses two long panels of Social Security Administration (SSA) earnings
data: the 2004 Benefits and Earnings Public-Use File (BEPUF) and the 2006
Earnings Public-Use File (EPUF). The BEPUF includes individual level annual
Social Security taxable earnings from 1951 to 2003 for 473,366 workers. This is
a one percent random, representative sample of beneficiaries entitled to receive
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Social Security benefits in December 2004. The sample is drawn from records of 47
million individuals in the Master Beneficiary Record, which the SSA validates and
keeps current in order to administer benefits programs. The panel lacks data on
other income sources, taxes paid, hours worked and household status, but includes
year of birth, sex, and combined wages and net self-employment income subject to
taxes for the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and Self-Employment
Contributions Act (Mulvey, 2010).
Workers covered by Social Security have changed over the period of this sam-
ple. Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010, p. 102) describe some of these changes:
Initially, Social Security covered only “commerce and industry” employees, defined as
most private for-profit sector employees...An important expansion took place in 1951
when self-employed workers and farm and domestic employees were included. This
reform also expanded coverage to some government and nonprofit employees...with
coverage increasing significantly further in 1954 and then slowly expanding since then.
The dates of entry of new worker groups are important, as the entrance into the
data of government employees with stable earnings may explain some of the fall
in earnings variability estimated in the early 1950s. Also, military personnel were
covered by Social Security only since 1957. This may explain some of the high level
of earnings variability in the early 1950s, as many Korean War soldiers left and
then re-entered the sample between 1951 and 1953, and the especially large drop
in men’s measured variability in 1957.3 While the entry of these groups created
3The measured fall in highly variable movements between 1951 and 1957 (Figure 3.9) shows a
fall from 30 to 20 percent of men with both positive and zero earnings in an eleven year period.
Some of the falling fraction with years of zero earnings is likely caused by military personnel entering
the sample due to coverage changes. The two million members of the armed forces at this time only
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downward pressure on earnings variability, there appears to have been other long-run
forces pushing down variability, as the short-term and long-term earnings variability
of the bottom half of the distribution consistently fell until the mid-1960s (Figure 3.4).
The BEPUF does not allow the identification of workers from specific sectors
or whether earnings were from self-employment. Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010)
have employee sectors in their SSA data and use it to follow non-self-employment
earnings of a consistent group of “commerce and industry” workers. In contrast, my
group of workers changes over time, starting with a number of worker groups and
growing with the expansion of Social Security coverage. To mitigate the effect of
these sample changes, I focus on earnings from 1957 and afterward.
To make the sample representative of the labor force in past years, I estimate
sample weights to make a representative sample of workers based on year, age and
sex. Census data on labor force participation by age and sex in various years are
used to construct weights (see appendix B) and earnings are indexed to 2010 dollars
with the CPI-U. The sample has a number of other limitations. The BEPUF only
includes those receiving benefits in 2004, so deceased workers and those not yet
receiving benefits are not included in the sample. Also, younger cohorts in the
sample are non-representative because they retired early and tended to have low
earnings. Thus cohorts since the second half of the baby boom (born after 1954) are
excluded.
account for about 4 percent of men in the labor force, and women made up only one percent of
active military personnel. So the addition of military earnings to the sample may explain about half
of this fall in earnings variability.
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Earnings values in the BEPUF are random rounded with a base of $25 and
are also top-coded. The top-coding level is the amount of earnings subject to Social
Security taxation in a given year. Congress originally set the taxable limit by statute.
Since 1972, the limit has been indexed to the increase in average wages. To increase
revenue, Congress increased the taxable earnings base with 1977 amendments to
cover 90 percent of all earnings (Mulvey, 2010). The top-coded fraction of the sample
(zero earnings excluded)—which is used in this study to set cutoffs—increases from
34 percent in 1951, to 52 percent in 1965 before dropping to 41 percent the next
year, to 25 percent in 1974, and below 10 percent in 1981. Top-coding clearly limits
how this sample can be used.
To avoid top-coding issues, I focus on later years suffering from less top-coding
and limit the sample to the bottom half of the distribution for most estimates.
Despite these issues, the BEPUF looks similar to other estimates of the individual
earnings distribution: median earnings of men and women look similar to Census
estimates (Figure 3.1) and percentile ratios look similar to estimates by KSS (Figure
B1), although the exclusion of workers from recent cohorts may push my inequality
estimates above theirs in more recent years.
I limit this study to prime-age workers between the ages of 25 and 60 and focus on
earnings changes between 1973 and 1985 due to data issues and because this is the
period of rapidly growing earnings inequality (Goldin and Katz, 2007). Beyond 1990,
much of the sample retires and younger cohorts do not enter the sample. In the
bottom half of the distribution, the median ages in 1973 and 1985 were 38 and 40, so
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Figure 3.1 : “Full-time” median individual earnings in Census and BEPUF data
                
Note: Census data for full-time, year-round workers. Social Security earnings data (BEPUF) in-
cludes those who are at least 16 years old and in order to remove non-full-time workers, drops those
with earnings below 1.5 times the full-year full-time minimum wage ($10,300 in 2004) indexed by
nominal average wages ($2010, CPI-U).
age-bias does not appear to significantly affect the sample in this period. The fraction
of top-coded annual earnings in the bottom half of the 1973 centered distribution
increases with longer periods: from 3 percent over three years, to 14 percent over
eleven years, and 27 percent over thirty-one years (although this decreases to 18
percent when including workers with zero earnings in some years). Top-coding in
1985 is not much of an issue, with the fraction of top-coded annual earnings only
0.1 percent over eleven years and 5 percent over thirty-one years. The higher initial
fraction of top-coded earnings may bias the initial variability downward and thus
the fraction of inequality explained by variability upward. I perform a number
of robustness checks to show that alternative cutoffs give similar results. Top-
coding should not affect the analysis of falling earnings variability between 1958 and
1965, as the fraction top-coded over three-year periods increases from 8 to 10 percent.
58
The BEPUF may not be representative for older cohorts if longevity and earnings
are correlated. It may also not be representative for the remaining younger cohorts,
as early retirement appears correlated with low earnings. To verify results from the
BEPUF and extend the analysis to later years, I turn to another dataset without
these issues. The EPUF is a recently released public use microdata set with similar
earnings data as the BEPUF. Instead of the sample being drawn from those receiving
benefits at a given point in time, the EPUF is drawn from a one percent random
sample of all Social Security numbers issued before 2007. The SSA notes that except
for a few exceptions, all of this data comes from the summary segment of the SSA’s
Master Earnings File.
The EPUF includes over 60 million annual earnings records for approximately
3 million individuals. See Compson (2011) for more discussion of the EPUF and
how it compares with the BEPUF. A 10 percent random sample is drawn from the
EPUF, leaving 264,390 workers in the panel. Compared with the Census and KSS,
the EPUF yields similar estimates of earnings levels and inequalities (Figures B3
and B4).4
3.3 Earnings variability for the bottom of the distribution
Using BEPUF and EPUF, I find that between 1973 and 1985 at least half of increas-
ing annual inequality among the bottom half of the distribution is attributable to
4I follow the same restrictions as Fig. III in KSS—keeping only workers above the threshold all
five years—to estimate Gini coefficients for annual and five-year average earnings and then using
Eqn. 2.1 to estimate variability. Only later years in the sample are somewhat comparable because
of less top-coding. In 1985, both the KSS and EPUF samples have 5 percent variability and in 1990
they both have 4 percent variability. After this, KSS earnings variability falls to 3 percent, while
the EPUF remains at 4 percent.
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increasing variability. This effect grows when considering variability over more years:
variability over 21 years caused two-thirds of the increase in annual inequality, and
variability over 31 years caused three-quarters. When years of zero earnings are in-
cluded, variability explains all of the increase in inequality. Variability also caused
falling inequality between the late-1950s and mid-1960s. I verify these results with
a number of dispersion measures and show that increasing variability resulted from
increasing movements in and out of employment by men. First, I show these results
for the BEPUF and then confirm them with the EPUF.
3.3.1 Individual Earnings Variability: 1973-1985
Annual earnings inequality is larger than five-year average earnings inequality. The
gap between these annual and multi-year inequalities represents the fraction of
annual inequality explained by variability. For example, the left side of Figure 3.2
shows that five-year variability in the bottom half of the BEPUF caused about
one third of annual earnings inequality in the 1970s.5 As the number of years over
which earnings are averaged increases, the fraction of increasing inequality caused
by variability also increases. For example, the right side of Figure 3.2 shows that
the gap between annual and thirty-one-year average earnings inequalities grew much
wider than the gap between annual and five-year average earnings inequalities.
Using the methodology outlined in Chapter 2, Table 3.1 shows individual earnings
variability and its effect on annual inequality. Measuring dispersion with the Sym-
metric Theil index, earnings variability over five years explains half of the increase
5Variability measures are Shorrocks indices and follow Equation 2.1.
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Figure 3.2 : Annual and multi-year individual earnings Symmetric Theil Indices for
the bottom half of the distribution (zero earnings excluded)
    
Note: Annual and multi-year indices only include those in the BEPUF sample turning 25 to 60 years
old and with positive earnings throughout the multi-year period. Multi-year measures are centered
and cutoffs (medians) are set with multi-year earnings. ($2010, CPI-U).
in annual inequality and variability over thirty-one years explains three-quarters
of the increase in annual inequality. The Atkinson index, an entropy measure
emphasizing the middle of the distribution when the inequality aversion () is one
half, gives similar results as the symmetric Theil index. Variance of log earnings
shows variability explaining a larger fraction of annual inequality, as it emphasizes
low earnings, but it shows similar estimates for the fraction of annual inequality
increase explained by variability. Compared with these dispersion measures, the
Gini coefficient shows variability explaining about half as much of annual inequality.
Estimates for the percent of annual inequality increase explained by variability are
also about half the size for Gini coefficients, but the gap with other dispersion
measures narrows over longer multi-year periods.
I perform a number of alternative top censoring strategies and find that the
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Table 3.1 : Increasing individual earnings inequality and variability for bottom half
of distribution (zero earnings excluded)
Fraction Annual Annual Annual Fraction Annual
Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality
from Variability Increase due Increase Increase from
1973 1985 to Variability Variability
Symmetric
Theil
3 Years 25% 29% 0.0217 0.0518 42%
5 Years 33% 37% 0.0263 0.0537 49%
11 Years 40% 47% 0.0398 0.0670 59%
21 Years 45% 53% 0.0391 0.0611 64%
31 Years 47% 62% 0.0507 0.0668 76%
Atkinson
Index
=0.5
3 Years 23% 26% 0.0084 0.0215 39%
5 Years 30% 34% 0.0104 0.0226 46%
11 Years 37% 44% 0.0166 0.0289 58%
21 Years 43% 51% 0.0173 0.0279 62%
31 Years 45% 61% 0.0231 0.0309 75%
Variance of
Log
Earnings
3 Years 36% 39% 0.459 1.082 42%
5 Years 44% 47% 0.514 1.019 50%
11 Years 51% 56% 0.655 1.129 58%
21 Years 57% 63% 0.485 0.737 66%
31 Years 62% 71% 0.679 0.922 74%
Gini
Coefficient
3 Years 11% 12% 0.0082 0.0363 23%
5 Years 15% 17% 0.0105 0.0401 26%
11 Years 19% 24% 0.0256 0.0599 43%
21 Years 19% 28% 0.0380 0.0793 48%
31 Years 16% 36% 0.0663 0.1006 66%
Note: Annual and multi-year measures only include those in the BEPUF sample turning 25 to
60 years old and with positive earnings throughout the multi-year period. Multi-year measures are
centered and cutoffs (medians) are set with multi-year earnings. Summary statistics in Table B1.
($2010, CPI-U).
results in Table 3.1 are robust to considering the bottom three, four or six deciles.
Results are also robust to setting various thresholds on minimum earnings, moving
the time window backwards or forwards one year, and relaxing the age restrictions
to include earnings for anyone at least 16 years old (Table B2). Considering just
men, the fraction of annual inequality from variability is slightly lower, but the
fraction of annual inequality increase from variability is similar to that of the entire
population (Table B3). Also, replacing annual inequalities in Equation 2.1 with
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smoothed annual inequalities gives similar results for three, five and eleven-year
periods (Table B4). Over longer periods, smoothed annual inequalities are relatively
constant between 1973 and 1985 and so there is no trend to explain, as the initial
year includes high inequalities in later years and the final year includes low values in
earlier years.
Including years of zero individual earnings in the sample dramatically increases the
estimated impact of variability on annual inequality. This is because including these
years of no earnings—but still during one’s “working life”6—captures more move-
ments in and out of employment, where spells of non-employment last at least one
calendar year. To limit the effect of workers with tenuous labor force participation,
workers only remain in a multi-year sample if their average earnings throughout
the multi-year period was above the threshold ($2,575 in 2004 and indexed with
average earnings). Note that the absolute dollar cutoff for the bottom of the sample
does not change when adding zero earnings. Although this results in more than
half of workers being in the “bottom half” of the zeros included sample, it means
individual workers are only added to the zeros excluded sample and none are dropped.
Symmetric Theil indices show that including zero earnings increases the fraction
of annual inequality explained by variability in 1985 by at least twenty percentage
points (Table 3.2). Whether measuring dispersion with symmetric Theil or Atkinson
indices, including years of zero earnings means earnings variability explains almost
6To limit years of zero earnings due to late entry into the labor force or early retirement, an
individual’s “working life” is set with two restrictions. First, earnings before they turn 25 years old
and after they turn 60 years old are dropped. Then any years of zero earnings before the first year
of positive earnings or after the last year of positive earnings are dropped.
63
Table 3.2 : Increasing individual earnings inequality and variability for bottom half
of distribution (zero earnings included)
Fraction Annual Annual Annual Fraction Annual
Inequality Inequality Inequality Inequality
from Variability Increase due Increase Increase from
1973 1985 to Variability Variability
Symmetric
Theil
3 Years 62% 69% 0.1157 0.1250 93%
5 Years 69% 75% 0.1598 0.1735 92%
11 Years 77% 81% 0.2239 0.2379 94%
21 Years 80% 82% 0.1976 0.2132 93%
31 Years 81% 83% 0.1192 0.1231 97%
Atkinson
Index
=0.5
3 Years 41% 50% 0.0278 0.0326 85%
5 Years 49% 57% 0.0388 0.0456 85%
11 Years 56% 65% 0.0583 0.0654 89%
21 Years 60% 67% 0.0557 0.0633 88%
31 Years 62% 68% 0.0432 0.0453 95%
Gini
Coefficient
3 Years 14% 18% 0.0212 0.0406 52%
5 Years 18% 23% 0.0312 0.0558 56%
11 Years 20% 30% 0.0590 0.0875 67%
21 Years 20% 32% 0.0732 0.1017 72%
31 Years 19% 34% 0.0818 0.0959 85%
Note: Annual and multi-year measures only include those in the BEPUF sample turning 25 to 60
years old, in their “working life”, and with average earnings throughout the multi-year period above
the threshold ($2,575 in 2004 and indexed with average earnings). Multi-year measures are centered
and medians are set with multi-year earnings of the sample excluding zeros, i.e., the same medians
as in Table 3.1. Summary statistics in Table B1. ($2010, CPI-U).
all of the increase in annual inequality. With the Gini coefficient, including years
of zero earnings doubles the fraction of the annual inequality increase explained by
variability to over half for three and five-year periods, two-thirds over eleven years,
and nearly three-quarters over twenty-one years. Variance of log earnings is not
shown because the heavy weighting of zeros overwhelms annual inequality measures.
The variability increase when including years of zero earnings seems mostly
due to men, as inequality and variability both decrease for the sample of only women.
Before discussing how this trend is explained by increased movement in and out of
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employment by men, I first support these findings with measures of relative and
absolute earnings variability.
3.3.2 Relative and Absolute Earnings Variability
While I have emphasized Shorrocks indices, earnings variability can also be measured
by the amount of rank reversals, or relative variability, and the size of earnings
changes, or absolute variability. As inequality increases, workers at the same place
in the distribution tend to have larger proportional gaps between themselves, so the
same amount of rank-reversal requires larger absolute earnings moves. This means
absolute variability should increase at least as fast as relative variability for the
fraction of inequality from variability to maintain the same level, and larger increases
in absolute earnings variability for the fraction to increase. The data support this
reasoning, showing large increases in relative mobility and larger increases in absolute
mobility.
Between 1965 and 1985, annual relative variability doubled (Figure 3.3). While
long-run relative variability only increased by one-third, absolute variability in the
short and long-run more than doubled (Figure 3.4). So growing absolute variability
accompanied growing relative variability. These variability increases look similar
when excluding zero earnings.
Variability measures before the addition of military earnings in 1957 are shown with
whited-out markers. This compositional change appears to explain the sharp fall in
variability the year of the change. Much of the high mobility between 1951 and 1953
may be due to soldiers—including over one million Korean War draftees—moving
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Figure 3.3 : Relative variability for bottom half of the distribution (zero earnings
included)
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Note: Relative variability measured by 1-Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients between year t
and t+n real earnings. Same BEPUF sample as in Table 3.2, except median cutoffs are set with
initial year earnings of the sample excluding zeros. Markers are whited-out in early years because of
narrower sample coverage, which may bias variability estimates upward.
in or out of the sample. Annual relative variability measures suggest only a slight
fall or constant relative variability in the 1950s, while absolute variability clearly
fell in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The small annual variability rise in 1954 is
possibly associated with the post-Korean War recession (Figures 3.3 and 3.4), as for
the bottom of the distribution, recessions tend to increase variability and recoveries
decrease variability.
Levels and changes in absolute variability differ across the income distribution. Ab-
solute variability, as measured by the variance of earnings changes over a decade, is
highest for the bottom of the earnings distribution and decreases as one moves up
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Figure 3.4 : Absolute variability for bottom half of the distribution (zero earnings
included)
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Note: Variance of arc percentage change in real annual earnings between year t and t+n. Same
BEPUF sample as in Table 3.2, except median cutoffs are set with initial year earnings of the
sample excluding zeros.
the earnings distribution (Figure 3.5). Since 1970, absolute earnings variability in-
creased dramatically for the bottom seven deciles and somewhat for the eighth and
ninth deciles.7 This has led to a dramatic fanning out of absolute variability over the
distribution, which is also seen in tax unit earnings data (Figure 2.5). This pattern
repeats itself when looking at annual earnings changes and changes over twenty years.
The bottom decile (not shown) mirrors the third decile since the mid-1960s, but is flat
before that, likely because it contains many women with low labor force attachment
and few changes to extensive margin variability.
7Top-coding prevents the estimation of variability for the top one percent, so the BEPUF data
cannot confirm the top one percent variability trends studied in chapter 2.
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Figure 3.5 : Absolute variability by decile (zero earnings included)
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Note: Variability measured by variance of arc percentage changes between year t and t+10. Same
BEPUF sample as in Table 3.2, except deciles are set with t to t+10 average earnings of the sample
including zero earnings.
3.3.3 Falling Variability: 1957-1966
There is a striking decline in observed absolute variability from 1957 to the mid-
1960s. This fall is seen for both short and long-term absolute earnings variability and
across the bottom of the distribution (Figures 3.4 and 3.5). This falling variability
also explains much of falling annual inequality.
From 1958 to 1965, decreasing three-year earnings variability for the bottom
two quintiles explains 93 percent of decreasing symmetric Theil indices, 85 percent
of decreasing annual Atkinson indices, and 69 percent of decreasing Gini coefficients
(Table 3.3, panel A). A similar impact of decreasing earnings variability on inequality
is seen between 1959 and 1966 for three and five-year variability (panel B). A
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potential bias in this analysis may come from missing older workers, as the maximum
age in the sample was 48 in 1958 and 55 in 1965. This does not seem to be an
issue, as results are similar for the EPUF, which does not suffer from age bias. By
looking at cohort specific variabilities, we can identify one possible cause of this fall
in variability. Figure B2 suggests that overall earnings variability declined because of
a fall in middle aged worker variability and as younger cohorts with lower variability
entered the sample.
Winship (2009, Fig. A1) also comments on declining relative mobility over
this period, finding that between WWII and the mid-1960s the fraction of people
rising out of the bottom two quintiles in one year fell from a third to a fifth. These
observations suggest that without falling variability in the bottom of the earnings
distribution, annual inequality would have been higher in the 1960s.8
Income variability at the top of the distribution may have also fallen since the
mid-1940s. Winship (2009) finds that between the mid-1940s and mid-1960s the
fraction of individuals falling out of the top two earnings quintiles in one year
decreased from 16 to 9 percent. If top earnings variability followed a similar
correlation as bottom earnings, then decreasing variability may have also caused
part of decreasing inequality in the 1940s and 1950s. Capital gains, which were low
and less cyclical throughout the 1960s than other periods (Piketty and Saez, 2003),
may have also contributed to falling top income variability.
8While the late 1950s inequality decrease is seen for the bottom of the distribution, it is not
seen in measures for the entire distribution. This is because increasing upper middle class inequality
seems to have cancelled out the compression of bottom earnings. KSS estimate that between 1955
and 1965 log(P50/P20) decreased from 0.60 to 0.55, while log(P80/P50) increased from 0.33 to 0.35.
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Table 3.3 : Decreasing individual earnings inequality and variability for bottom two
quintiles (zero earnings included)
Fraction Annual Annual Annual Percentage Fraction Annual
Inequality Inequality Inequality Annual Inequality
from Variability Increase due Increase Inequality Increase from
to Variability Increase Variability
Panel A: 1958-1965 1958 1965
Symmetric Theil 3 Years 72% 58% -0.1814 -0.1950 -38% 93%
Atkinson (=0.5) 3 Years 55% 41% -0.0372 -0.0435 -27% 85%
Gini Coefficient 3 Years 22% 14% -0.0340 -0.0490 -10% 69%
Panel B: 1959-1966 1959 1966
Symmetric Theil
3 Years 67% 56% -0.1104 -0.1206 -28% 92%
5 Years 73% 63% -0.1596 -0.1734 -33% 92%
Atkinson (=0.5)
3 Years 49% 40% -0.0214 -0.0261 -17% 82%
5 Years 56% 46% -0.0297 -0.0361 -21% 82%
Gini Coefficient 3 Years 20% 16% -0.0158 -0.0263 -5% 60%
5 Years 23% 20% -0.0171 -0.0309 -5% 56%
Note: See Table 3.2 for sample details. Second quintile cutoffs (P40) set with multi-year average earnings of
the sample excluding zeros.
Cohort size fluctuations may have contributed to falling then rising earnings
variability, especially in the bottom half of the distribution. The 1930s baby bust
could have raised low wages and decreased variability as this small cohort entered
the labor force in the mid-1950s, and the large 1946-1956 baby boom could have
depressed low wages and increased variability as they started working in the 1970s
(Macunovich, 1998, 2000). One reason for this cohort effect may come from younger
workers having a more volatile number of hours worked and so more earnings
variability (Jaimovich and Siu, 2009).
Different cohorts have persistently low or high earnings variability throughout
their working lives. The birth cohorts entering the labor market in the Great
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Depression have persistently high variability (left side of Figure B2), cohorts entering
the labor market in the 1950s and 1960s have persistently low variability, and cohorts
entering the labor market in the 1970s have persistently high variability (right side).
These findings relate to those of Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004), who show
that cohorts entering the labor force during economic downturns have persistently
higher idiosyncratic labor earnings risk. I now discuss two other pathways for falling
and then rising earnings variability: changes in movements in and out of employment
and changes in directional mobility.
3.3.4 Men’s Movements in and out of Employment:
From Organization Man to Rolling Stone
Earnings variability trends differ starkly between men and women. Falling earnings
variability in the 1950s and early 1960s appears almost completely due to men
(left side of Figure 3.6). By measuring the fraction of men of men with both zero
and positive earnings over an eleven-year period in their “working life”, the right
side of Figure 3.6 measures a subset of extensive margin effects, which I refer to as
movements in and out of employment. It appears that decreasing movement in and
out of employment by men caused their decreasing earnings variability. Similarly, it
appears that increasing movement in and out of employment by men later caused
their increasing earnings variability in the 1970s and 1980s. The flat trend in
movements in and out of employment by women suggests that their increasing
earnings variability was caused by intensive margin variability, i.e., changes in hourly
wages or the number of hours worked, which I refer to as mobility.
William H. Whyte’s classic The Organization Man was first published in 1956.
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He comments on the trend of middle class men becoming more strongly linked to
a particular organization, in many cases, a specific corporate or government job.
Whereas some may value a smaller fraction of workers moving in and out of em-
ployment because of greater stability, Whyte criticized the decreasing individualism
accompanying this change. However, he would perhaps not celebrate the rise in
variability in the bottom half of the distribution studied here as it does not appear
to necessarily result from increased individualism.
Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) propose how institutional changes led to more
movement in and out of employment. Rising trade, diffusion of know-how, and
integration of capital markets caused more footloose industries and more volatility
in comparative advantage. This caused more labor turnover between industries
and frictional unemployment.9 Indeed, over half of male workers in the bottom
of the distribution had a year of zero earnings between 1980 and 1990, twice the
fraction with zero earnings between 1965 and 1975. Industry level volatility may
have also flattened earnings growth profiles because of decreased firm-specific human
accumulation: “a rolling stone gathers no moss and a moving worker gathers no
skills” (p. 56). Bhagwati and Dehejia thus paint a picture of a transformation from
organization man to rolling stone.
This rolling stone phenomenon is seen in declining worker-firm attachment. Con-
trolling for age, Farber (2008) estimates that between 1973 and 1988 the mean
tenure for men in the private sector declined 10 percent, while holding relatively
9Comin, L.Groshen and Rabin (2009) find that since 1980, rising turbulence in the sales of large
U.S. firms caused increased earnings volatility, much of which was likely from job loss.
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Figure 3.6 : Absolute individual earnings variability (zeros earnings included) and
fraction moving in and out of employment
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Note: BEPUF set as in Table 3.2, where medians are set with eleven-year average earnings (t to
t+10) in the sample with zero earnings excluded. Variability measured by variance of arc percentage
change of earnings between year t and t+10 and movements in and out of employment measured by
the fraction with both zero and positive earnings in the eleven-year period.
constant for women. Figure 3.7 shows a similar decrease in men’s tenure on their
longest job, while an increase in tenure length from the 1950s to the early 1960s
corresponds to the fall in variability. The long-run trend is even more pronounced for
non-white men. Increased churning between employers is also reflected in measures
of unemployment. Comparing 1973 and 1985, the probability that a male household
head who was employed two years prior was unemployed grew from 2 to 4 percent
(Keys and Danziger, 2008, Fig. 3.5).10
In addition to the U-shaped fraction of men moving in and out of employment, another
10For a review of literature on job stability in recent decades see Winship (2009, pp. 169–177).
Using the PSID, Leonardi (2003) finds that earnings instability increased much more over the 1970s
and 1980s among job changers than job stayers.
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Figure 3.7 : Median tenure on the longest job for men
   
Source: Stevens (2008). Five-year cohort ranges with Retirement History Survey used for 1909
cohort.
trend emerges: the fraction of men and women moving in and out of employment
converged. While less than 30 percent of men in the bottom half of the distribution
moved in and out of the employment over an eleven-year period in the early 1960s, over
50 percent did so by the 1980s.11 Meanwhile, over half of women in the bottom half
of the distribution moved in or out of employment throughout this period. Besides
this convergence of movements in and out of employment, other aspects of earnings
patterns—such as earnings mobility—have become more similar between men and
women.
11Practically all of the men moving in and out of employment were in the bottom half of the
distribution.
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3.3.5 Increasing Relative Upward Mobility
We can focus on earnings mobility, rather than movements in and out of employment,
by removing workers falling below an annual earnings threshold. Using a threshold
of $2,575 in 2004 and indexed with average earnings, I make two observations about
how earnings mobility changed between the 1960s and 1980s. First, median earnings
mobility became more similar for men and women. Second, the distribution of
earnings mobilities shows larger relative upward mobility; that is, the workers with
the largest gains made much larger gains relative to median earnings changes in the
1980s than in the 1960s.
Earnings mobility, as measured by within decile median arc percentage earn-
ings changes, converged between men and women across the earnings distribution.
Figure 3.8 compares earnings mobility in two periods—1960 to 1970 and 1980 to
1990—and shows that men had higher median upward mobility than women in the
1960s, but that by the 1980s median mobility looked similar for men and women.
This convergence resulted from a decrease in the median mobility of most men. A
minor difference in the 1980s is that women’s median earnings mobility in the fifth
to eighth deciles remained slightly positive, whereas men’s was zero. The trends in
Figure 3.8 look similar for twenty-one year earnings changes.
Gaps between workers’ earnings gains widened in the 1980s. Between the 1960s and
1980s, within decile median earnings changes fell, while the 95th percentile increased.
This created a large gap between median and 95th percentile of earnings changes
and represents an increase in relative upward mobility for a handful of workers.
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Figure 3.8 : Distribution of absolute earnings mobility over the 1960s and 1980s   
 
Note: Real arc percentage earnings changes shown: medians with solid line, interquartile range
(25th and 75th percentiles) with dashed line and 5th and 95th percentiles with light dashed lines. To
measure mobility, workers in the BEPUF with initial or final year earnings below threshold ($2,575
in 2004 and indexed with average earnings) are excluded. Deciles assigned with initial year earnings
for men and women together and excluding zero earnings. ($2010, CPI-U).
Ignoring the median gains made by the bottom three deciles, the 1980s trend of
stagnant median earnings accompanied by larger gains for some workers seems to
fit a popular narrative of how inequality increased with the weakening of unions.
Unions and collective bargaining may partly explain the narrow range of earnings
changes in the 1960s, while the decline of unions could facilitate the widening of
earnings changes (Katz and Autor, 1999). These observations also fit with the
search literature emphasizing how better matching across heterogeneous workers
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could explain increased heterogeneity of earnings changes, even for apparently
similar workers a priori—in this case, in the same initial decile (Bagger et al., 2011;
Leonardi, 2003). Alternatively, the increased dispersion of earnings changes may
have also resulted from increased movements in and out of employment, as many of
these movements would not be removed by the low threshold applied in Figure 3.8.
Longitudinal earnings changes by decile stand in sharp contrast to cross-sectional
hourly wage changes in the 1980s. Real earnings changes are strongly positive for
the bottom of the distribution and fall to near zero for the middle and upper parts
of the distribution. Cross-sectional relative six-year wage changes by decile form
an upward sloping trend from negative to positive 9 percent in the 1980s (Juhn,
Murphy and Pierce, 1993, Fig. 4). Earnings variability is a function of changes in
hourly wage rates and hours worked. Whereas changes in the supply and demand
of skills may affect hourly wages, fluctuations in hours worked cause a significant
fraction of earnings changes. Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2008) estimate that
between 1973 and 1985 there was about a 20 percent increase in the volatility of
both household head real wages and hours worked. This paper captures both of
these effects in measures of earnings variability and suggests that trends in volatility
of hours worked were driven by long unemployment spells among men.
3.3.6 Movements in and out of employment by men explain increasing
earnings variability
So did earnings variability increase because of extensive margin movements in and
out of employment or intensive margin changes? To identify the source inequality
growth due to variability, I make a number of additional restrictions and repeat the
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analysis in Table 3.2, where zero earnings are included unless removed by one of the
restrictions explained below. I find that extensive margin movements explain all of
the earnings inequality increase due to variability between 1973 and 1985.
In order to isolate extensive margin variability, I remove intensive margin variability.
This is done by replacing any annual earnings over six times the threshold (about one
and a half times the minimum wage) with that worker’s multi-year average earnings,
thus removing intensive margin variability by closing the gap between annual and
multi-year earnings. The increase in annual inequality is still completely explained
by the remaining extensive margin variability for both the entire sample and the
sample of only men (using five-year earnings and the symmetric Theil). Meanwhile,
none of the increase in annual inequality is explained by variability for the entire
sample and the sample of only women.
In order to isolate intensive margin variability, I remove extensive margin variability
by replacing any annual earnings under four times the threshold (about the minimum
wage) with that worker’s multi-year average earnings. As a worker earning less than
the annual equivalent of the minimum wage was most likely not working part of the
year, this is exactly the extensive margin variability I would like to remove. Once
the extensive margin variability is removed, none of the increase in inequality is
explained by variability. This results hold when using the Symmetric Theil for five
and thirty-one year earnings.
Finally, I want to see if women’s increased labor force participation caused
part of the increase in earnings variability. Women have higher levels of variability
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because of a greater fraction in the bottom half of the distribution moving in and
out of employment. So a larger fraction of workers being women will tend to increase
earnings variability. However, this higher level of variability is offset by the long-run
decrease in movements in and out of employment by women. It appears that two
opposing forces resulted in no effect from a changing fraction of workers being
women. When I fix the weight of women at their 1973 level (or even at half that
level) I see no change in the effect of variability on inequality.
3.3.7 Similar Results with the Earnings Public-Use File (EPUF)
An alternative Social Security Administration earnings panel sample, the EPUF,
shows similar impacts of variability on earnings inequality as the BEPUF. Table
3.4, panel A shows that from 1973 to 1985 increasing variability explained at least
half of increasing inequality when excluding workers with any zero earnings in each
multi-year period. When including workers with years of zero earnings, increasing
variability again explains all of increasing individual earnings inequality (panel
B). Also similar to the BEPUF results, Table 3.5 shows that in the EPUF falling
earnings inequality in the late 1950s and early 1960s was almost entirely explained
by falling variability.
Movements in and out of employment have a similar U-shaped trend in the EPUF
(Figure 3.9). This trend emerges for the fraction of men who had one, two, four or
six years of zero earnings over an eleven-year period within their “working life” (top,
left figure) and is also seen for the fraction of men with one, two or three quarters
of zero earnings in a year with positive earnings (top, right figure). Notice that we
are considering the entire distribution here, as top-coding will not interfere with
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Table 3.4 : Earnings inequality and variability for bottom half of the distribution
Fraction Annual Annual Annual Percentage Fraction Annual
Inequality Inequality Inequality Annual Inequality
from Variability Increase due Increase Inequality Increase
1973 1985 to Variability Increase from Variability
Panel A: Zero Earnings Excluded, No Threshold
Symmetric
Theil
3 Years 27% 29% 0.0126 0.0247 12% 51%
5 Years 35% 39% 0.0142 0.0211 12% 67%
11 Years 43% 48% 0.0188 0.0239 18% 79%
Atkinson
Index
(=0.5)
3 Years 24% 26% 0.0047 0.0098 11% 48%
5 Years 32% 36% 0.0055 0.0086 11% 64%
11 Years 41% 46% 0.0080 0.0103 16% 78%
Variance
of Log
Earnings
3 Years 37% 40% 0.0805 0.1373 18% 59%
5 Years 46% 51% 0.0838 0.1110 18% 75%
11 Years 55% 60% 0.0843 0.1017 22% 83%
Gini Co-
efficient
3 Years 12% 12% 0.0046 0.0144 5% 32%
5 Years 16% 18% 0.0055 0.0129 5% 42%
11 Years 21% 24% 0.0120 0.0198 8% 61%
Panel B: Zero Earnings Included, Threshold Applied to Multi-year Earnings
Symmetric
Theil
3 Years 66% 68% 0.0353 0.0351 7% 100%
5 Years 73% 74% 0.0497 0.0521 8% 95%
11 Years 79% 80% 0.0891 0.0923 11% 96%
Atkinson
Index
(=0.5)
3 Years 46% 49% 0.0104 0.0105 7% 100%
5 Years 53% 56% 0.0145 0.0156 9% 93%
11 Years 60% 64% 0.0255 0.0270 13% 94%
Gini Co-
efficient
3 Years 16% 18% 0.0098 0.0125 4% 79%
5 Years 20% 22% 0.0140 0.0183 5% 77%
11 Years 24% 29% 0.0300 0.0349 9% 86%
Note: EPUF with same restrictions as Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
these extensive margin measures. The fraction of the entire population moving in
and out of employment increased from 17 to 27 percent, while the fraction of the
entire sample from the bottom half of the BEPUF increased from about 13 to 27
percent. Hence almost all of the increase in movements in and out of employment
were concentrated in the bottom half of the distribution. This is not surprising, as
those with years of zero earnings will naturally be lower in the distribution, but
it makes clear that the secular increase in extensive margin variability was largely
due to low earnings male workers. Women’s fraction of years and quarters with
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Table 3.5 : Individual earnings inequality and variability for bottom two quintiles,
zero earnings included
Fraction Annual Annual Annual Percentage Fraction Annual
Inequality Inequality Inequality Annual Inequality
from Variability Change due Change from Inequality Change
to Variability Change Variability
Panel A: 1958-1965 1958 1965
Symmetric Theil 3 Years 67% 61% -0.0712 -0.0751 -17% 95%
Atkinson (=0.5) 3 Years 52% 46% -0.0164 -0.0183 -12% 90%
Gini Coefficient 3 Years 22% 19% -0.0162 -0.0214 -5% 76%
Panel B: 1959-1966 1959 1966
Symmetric Theil
3 Years 64% 57% -0.0643 -0.0684 -18% 94%
5 Years 71% 65% -0.0956 -0.1017 -20% 94%
Atkinson (=0.5)
3 Years 48% 42% -0.0139 -0.0159 -11% 88%
5 Years 55% 49% -0.0201 -0.0230 -14% 87%
Gini Coefficient 3 Years 19% 17% -0.0117 -0.0177 -4% 66%
5 Years 23% 20% -0.0158 -0.0235 -4% 67%
Note: EPUF with same restrictions as Tables 3.2 except second quintile cutoffs (P40) set with multi-year
average earnings of the sample excluding zeros.
zero earnings declined steadily since 1951 (bottom of Figure 3.9). The longer EPUF
panel also shows that extensive margin variability seemed to have peaked in the
early 1980s and since then has decreased modestly for men and rapidly for women.
Absolute earnings variability, seen in the next section, shows similar trends.
The cyclical trend of variability is seen clearly in the EPUF. Variability tends to in-
crease just before and at the beginning of a recession and fall immediately following a
recession. The spike in variability before recessions may result from a heated expan-
sion just before a downturn. Figure 3.10 shows that for the bottom two quintiles of the
EPUF, annual earnings variability had the same pronounced U-shaped trend seen in
the BEPUF. The EPUF shows that variability peaked following the early 1980s reces-
sion and then began a secular decline until 2000. Declining variability for the bottom
two quintiles was briefly interrupted by the 1991 recession, but quickly returned to
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Figure 3.9 : Fraction of men and women moving in and out of employment by years
and quarters (full sample above multi-year average earnings threshold)
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Note: Only includes those in the EPUF sample turning 25 to 60 years old and average earnings
throughout each eleven-year period above the threshold ($2,575 in 2004 and indexed with average
earnings). Full sample is included, not just bottom half, and only 1% subsample. Movements in
and out of employment measured by the fraction with both zero and positive earnings in each eleven-
year period from t to t+10 (left figures) and the fraction with quarters of zero earnings but positive
earnings that year (right figures).
the two decade trend. Earnings variability appears to have permanently increased
with the 2001 recession and as the 2008 recession likely caused an even larger increase
in variability, it is possible that 2000 marked a trough in a new U-shaped variability
trend starting in the early 1980s. Adding zero earnings (right side of Figure 3.10)
82
Figure 3.10 : Absolute annual variability of bottom two quintiles (EPUF)
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Note: Recessions lasting at least one full quarter in a year are shown in gray. Absolute variability
measured by variance of annual arc percentage earnings changes (between years t and t+1). Only
include those in the EPUF turning 25 to 60 years old. The left figure only includes male workers
with positive earnings throughout each two-year period. The right figure adds men with zero earnings.
P40 cutoffs are set by initial year earnings for the sample excluding zeros. ($2010, CPI-U).
doubles the level of variability and makes the effect of recessions starker. The same
pattern emerges over multiple years and for women, although women have a more
shallow U-shape pattern from 1950 to 1985 (Figure B5).
3.4 Variability and Inequality Trends, 1985-2000:
Was there a Great Moderation in Micro Earnings?
Recent studies on earnings variability since 1985 have provided mixed results, with
most studies finding flat variability, while others find either increasing or decreasing
variability. By dividing my sample, I show that different trends in the bottom and
top of the distribution may help explain the divergence of findings.
Between 1985 and 2000, annual earnings inequality within the bottom half of the
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Figure 3.11 : Falling annual earnings inequality in the bottom of the distribution and
increasing inequality in the top (zero earnings excluded)
                                                                                    
 
Note: EPUF sample set as in Table 3.1, but is only a one percent subsample. Sample only includes
workers with positive earnings throughout the five-year period, no threshold applied. Bottom half of
the distribution shown in left figure and the sixth to ninth deciles (P50-P90) shown in right figure.
Table 3.6 : Decreasing individual earnings inequality and variability for bottom half
of the distribution 1985-2000 (zero earnings excluded)
Fraction Annual Annual Annual Percentage Fraction Annual
Inequality Inequality Inequality Annual Inequality
from Variability Change due Change Inequality Change from
1985 2000 to Variability Change Variability
Symmetric
Theil
3 Years 29% 26% -0.0137 -0.0225 -10% 61%
5 Years 39% 34% -0.0138 -0.0148 -8% 93%
11 Years 48% 42% -0.0165 -0.0148 -9% 111%
Atkinson
Index
(e=0.5)
3 Years 26% 23% -0.0057 -0.0102 -10% 56%
5 Years 35% 31% -0.0061 -0.0069 -8% 88%
11 Years 46% 39% -0.0074 -0.0069 -9% 107%
Variance
of Log
Earnings
3 Years 40% 37% -0.0540 -0.0620 -7% 87%
5 Years 50% 46% -0.0489 -0.0338 -5% 145%
11 Years 60% 53% -0.0595 -0.0424 -7% 140%
Gini Co-
efficient
3 Years 12% 10% -0.0087 -0.0179 -6% 49%
5 Years 18% 15% -0.0102 -0.0124 -4% 82%
11 Years 24% 20% -0.0137 -0.0130 -5% 105%
Note: Annual and multi-year measures only include those in the EPUF sample turning 25 to 60
years old and positive earnings throughout each multi-year period. Multi-year measures are centered
and medians are set with multi-year earnings in the sample excluding zeros. ($2010, CPI-U).
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distribution fell (Figure 3.11, left side). Meanwhile, within the top of the distribution
earnings inequality increased (right side). Falling annual inequality in the bottom of
the distribution was largely caused by falling variability—half of the fall is explained
by falling three-year variability and all is explained by falling eleven-year variability
(Table 3.6). Most of the fall in both inequality and variability was caused by men,
especially over longer multi-year periods (Table B5).
Table 3.7 : Increasing individual earnings inequality and flat variability for top earn-
ers, P50–P90 (zero earnings excluded)
Fraction Annual Annual Annual Percentage Fraction Annual
Inequality Inequality Inequality Annual Inequality
from Variability Change due Change Inequality Change from
1985 2000 to Variability Change Variability
Symmetric
Theil
3 Years 27% 25% 0.0010 0.0058 16% 16%
5 Years 38% 36% 0.0018 0.0077 21% 23%
11 Years 56% 48% 0.0012 0.0091 25% 14%
Atkinson
Index
(ε=0.5)
3 Years 26% 24% 0.0004 0.0028 16% 15%
5 Years 37% 34% 0.0008 0.0037 21% 21%
11 Years 55% 47% 0.0006 0.0045 26% 14%
Variance
of Log
Earnings
3 Years 36% 34% 0.0022 0.0110 14% 20%
5 Years 50% 48% 0.0057 0.0167 19% 34%
11 Years 69% 60% -0.0012 0.0138 15% -8%
Gini Co-
efficient
3 Years 11% 11% 0.0004 0.0120 8% 4%
5 Years 16% 16% 0.0013 0.0164 11% 8%
11 Years 26% 23% 0.0006 0.0235 16% 3%
Note: Annual and multi-year measures only include those in the EPUF sample turning 25 to 60
years old and positive earnings throughout each multi-year period. Multi-year measures are centered
and cutoffs (P50 and P90) are set with multi-year earnings in the sample excluding zeros. ($2010,
CPI-U).
Increasing earnings inequality within the top of the distribution (P50-P90) between
1985 and 2000 appears to have been caused by changes in permanent earnings and
not increasing variability. Table 3.7 shows a large annual inequality increase of up to
a quarter for this part of the distribution, but that variability explains almost none
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of this increase when using Gini coefficients. Other dispersion measures are noisier,
but it appears that variability explains under a quarter of the increase in annual
inequality. The increase in top earnings inequality appears largely due to women
and variability explains about a third of increasing female earnings inequality (Table
B6). Meanwhile, men in the top of the distribution had relatively stagnant or even
falling earnings variability in this period. Results are similar using smoothed annual
earnings for the bottom and top of the distribution over three and five-years, but
in 2000 the annual inequality level is higher over eleven-years because of higher
post-2000 inequality.
Skill-biased technical change (SBTC) may help explain this divergence in vari-
ability trends between the bottom and top of the distribution. SBTC could mostly
affect the permanent component of earnings of higher-skilled workers in the top of
the distribution, hence the flat trend in their earnings variability. Meanwhile, it is
not clear how SBCT would cause falling earnings variability and movements in and
out of employment among lower-skilled workers. Perhaps the 1970s institutional
changes proposed by Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) began to have a less disruptive
effect on these workers in the period of the Great Moderation.
3.5 Conclusion
Annual earnings inequality can grow rapidly while longer-run earnings inequality
grows more slowly. This implies that earnings variability explains part of the change
in annual inequality. Between 1973 and 1985, I estimate that increasing individual
earnings variability in the bottom half of the distribution caused at least half of
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this group’s increase in annual inequality. When including years of zero earnings,
increasing individual earnings variability explains all of this group’s increase in
annual earnings inequality. Similarly, I present evidence that decreasing earnings
variability in the bottom of the distribution caused most of the decrease in annual
inequality between the late 1950s and mid-1960s. This suggests that the U-shaped
annual inequality trend between the 1950s and mid-1980s was largely caused by
falling and then rising variability. Long-run trends in movements in and out of
employment by men seem to have caused these changes in earnings variability.
Between 1985 and 2000, movements in and out of employment have declined
for both men and women. This has led to falling variability and inequality in
the bottom of the distribution. However, the 2001 recession seems to have caused
earnings variability to increase again and the 2008 recession has precipitated a
period of high rates of long-term unemployment, which will further increase earnings
variability. This paper suggests that these changes in variability could also have
large impacts on measures of annual earnings inequality.
Individual earnings variability may not translate into household consumption
volatility. While variability explains much of individual earnings inequality, it
explains about half as much tax unit after-tax income inequality (compare Tables 3.6
and 3.7 to Table 2.5). Much of this difference may be explained by intra-household
earnings smoothing, which can reduce consumption volatility (Dynarski and Gruber,
1997; Gottschalk and Danziger, 2005; Shore, 2010).12 Negative earnings shocks are
12Since 1985, however, family income variability and inequality seem to have continued increas-
ing despite decreasing individual earnings variability and inequality within the bottom half of the
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also partly offset by income stabilizers like unemployment insurance. Guvenen and
Smith (2010) find that income shocks are not very persistent and individuals have a
good idea about their future income prospects, allowing for consumption smoothing.
Intra-household earnings smoothing, income stabilizers, low persistence of earnings
shocks, and knowledge of future earnings suggest that changes in individual earnings
inequality and variability may be a poor guide to underlying welfare changes, despite
communicating important information about the labor market.
Even if low-income households know what their future income is likely to be,
some may be unable to fully smooth their consumption when they face negative
transitory shocks (Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2008). For example, households
that can rely less on these insurance strategies likely include low-income, single
parent households. A focus on inequality or variability measured by summary
statistics for the entire population dilute information about subgroups much more
likely to suffer real impacts from income variability.
distribution. Relative to earlier decades, Juhn and Potter (2007) find that the value of “marriage
insurance” from the added-worker effect decreased as employment became more positively correlated
within couples.
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Chapter 4
Lifetime Income Tax Progressivity
4.1 Introduction
Tax progressivity measures how tax burdens vary over the income distribution.
Although tax progressivity estimates traditionally use annual tax burdens and
incomes, if individuals and households can smooth consumption over time, then
tax progressivity should be considered from multi-year and perhaps even lifetime
perspectives. Income variability means annual and multi-year effective tax rates may
differ significantly. While those in the bottom decile of consistent tax filers pay little
or no income taxes in a given year, I estimate that over eleven years, these families
pay tax rates about five percentage points higher than annual rates suggest. I also
estimate that individuals in the bottom half of the earnings distribution pay more
taxes over their lifetimes than annual measures suggest.
Changes in tax progressivity capture much public attention because of vertical
equity concerns, but most estimates only present changes in annual tax pro-
gressivity.1 Income variability means that in a progressive tax system annual
1While punctuated by periods of reform, Hayes, Lambert and Slottje (1995) find that since the
1950s the tax code has generally become more progressive. Kasten, Sammartino and Toder (1994)
estimate that in the early 1980s progressivity declined but by 1993 had increased. Congressional
Budget Office (2008a) estimates decreasing effective federal tax rates across the income distribution
since 1970 with the largest cuts in the bottom half of the distribution. They also estimate a flattening
of progressivity within the top one percent. Similarly, Piketty and Saez (2007) find decreasing
progressivity among the top one percent since 1960 due to declining burdens of federal estate and
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and lifetime federal tax incidence can diverge, since for two workers with the
same lifetime income, the worker with the more variable income will pay more
taxes over their lifetime and so have a higher effective lifetime tax rate. A more
progressive tax system and a larger divergence in income variability between
workers with similar lifetime incomes will increase this horizontal inequity. So while
economists are familiar with the trade-off between vertical equity and efficiency, in-
come variability means there is also a trade-off between vertical and horizontal equity.
Previous studies find that lifetime tax burdens are more proportional than an-
nual taxes, as income taxes become less progressive and consumption taxes less
regressive (Davies and France St-Hilaire, 1984; Fullerton and Rogers, 1991, 1993,
1996; Metcalf, 1994). This difference may be especially pronounced at the bottom of
the distribution, where many taxpayers are young workers or retirees facing low tax
rates during the low points of their income profile. These studies have not addressed
the issue of heterogeneity in effective tax rates within lifetime income groups due to
differences in income variability. By considering the impact of income variability on
lifetime tax burdens, I estimate the extent of this horizontal inequity.
Estimating annual and lifetime tax burdens presents many difficulties because
of the short nature of most income panels and the limited size of the popular Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Early data will be missing for older workers in
most panel data sets and future incomes are obviously unavailable for those still
working. A popular approach to overcoming these limitations has been to estimate
corporate income taxes.
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lifetime income tax progressivity using current consumption as a proxy for lifetime
income (Davies, 1960; Poterba, 1989; Metcalf, 1994). Instead of trying to estimate
lifetime tax burdens, Congressional Budget Office (2005) estimates the difference
between annual and ten-year effective tax rates and finds that households in the
bottom two quintiles pay multi-year effective tax rates that are slightly higher than
annual tax rates. An alternative approach is to use parametric models of earnings
processes. Fullerton and Rogers (1993) construct a model in which wages change
smoothly over agents’ lifetimes and hours worked are optimized taking into account
tax policy, which implies that annual and lifetime tax incidence tend to differ
primarily because of average life-cycle income changes. In reality, each year over a
quarter of workers experience earnings increases or decreases of at least 50 percent
(Congressional Budget Office, 2008b). These idiosyncratic income shocks imply that
life-cycle effects will capture only a fraction of true income variability.2 In order
to capture the effects of income variability, I estimate lifetime effective tax rates
using a recently released Social Security Administration dataset, which is the longest
public-use panel of U.S. earnings available and includes over two million individuals.
Section 2 of this chapter presents estimates of annual and eleven-year tax pro-
gressivity for tax units. Section 3 presents estimates of annual and lifetime tax
progressivity for individuals. Section 4 concludes.
2In order to study the impact of a Hall-Rabushka flat tax, Ventura (1999) creates a model in
which agents have a common life-cycle wage profile and face idiosyncratic income shocks calibrated
to match aggregate U.S. earnings inequality, but he only reports cross-sectional distribution results.
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4.2 Differences in tax progressivity across tax units
I use the CWHS tax return panel (described in chapter 2) to compare annual and
eleven-year tax progressivities. For tax units, I find that within income group
effective tax rate heterogeneity decreases over time. Eleven-year tax rates are also
higher than annual tax rates at the bottom of the distribution.
Annual effective tax rates are calculated by dividing total taxes paid by cash
income (see chapter 2 for a definition of cash income). To calculate eleven-year
effective tax rates, incomes and taxes are first set to 2010 dollars with the CPI-U-RS
and then averaged over eleven years. A tax units average taxes paid over the
eleven-year period are then divided by their average income, which means eleven-
year tax rates are equivalent to dividing total constant dollar taxes paid by total
constant dollar income. I show tax rates for 1985 as this year allows the calculation
of eleven-year averages despite the short nature of the CWHS panel from 1979 to 1990.
Individuals within a specific income group may have significantly different tax
rates. The 2012 Economic Report of the President (p. 88) shows within each
income quintile the average tax rates for the bottom and top tax rate deciles. Tax
rates range between negative 14 to positive 16 percent in the bottom income quin-
tile, 2 to 24 percent in the middle quintile, and 9 to 35 percent in the top one percent.
Tax rate heterogeneity within income groups may result from different tax
rates on different forms of income, such as exclusions or preferential rates for capital
gains, or because of differences resulting from exemptions, itemized deductions,
92
and credits. Figure 4.1 shows within income group tax rate heterogeneity with the
gaps between median tax rates, the interquartile range of tax rates (25th and 75th
percentiles) and the extreme 5th and 95th percentile of tax rates. It is clear that
eleven-year tax rates (right side) have much more heterogeneity than annual tax
rates (left side), especially at the ends of the distribution. The bottom decile tax
rate gap (between the 5th to 95th percentiles) decreases from 20 to 10 percentage
points, and top half of one percent gap decreases from about 28 to 15 percentage
points.
Tax rate heterogeneity is lower over a decade, as compared to a single year.
This is because within income group differences even out over time. At the bottom
of the distribution, this may come from tax units with negative annual tax rates due
to claiming earned income credits and paying positive taxes in other years. At the
top of the distribution, other factors drive the convergence of within income group
tax rates over time. While large capital gains realizations may push down a tax
unit’s tax rate in a specific year, over a decade these gains and losses will converge
within an income group, driving down tax rate heterogeneity. Similarly, when a tax
unit initially buys a house, they will likely initially deduct a significant amount of
mortgage interest. Over time this interest deduction will dissipate, so averaging over
many years will smooth out this itemized deduction heterogeneity.
Part of the decrease in the heterogeneity of tax incidence may be due to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. This reform broadened the tax base and decreased some
of the reasons for tax rate heterogeneity. However, annual tax rate heterogeneity
looks similar in 1985 and 1988, so the reform does not seem to explain most of the
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patterns seen in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 : Annual and eleven-year tax unit average tax rates: 1985
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Note: The middle line is the earnings decile median tax rate. The dashed lines are the 25th and 75th
tax rate percentiles and the dotted lines are the 5th and 95th percentiles. Income groups are set with
eleven-year average cash income, so these two figures include the same individuals in each group.
Cash income is for all non-dependent tax units in the CWHS and only tax units present all eleven
years are included in the sample. Incomes and taxes are averaged over eleven years after setting to
2010 dollars with the CPI-U-RS.
In addition to comparing annual and eleven-year tax rate heterogeneity, I also
compare differences in average tax rate levels on an annual and eleven-year basis. To
control for changing tax policy over the 1980s, I average annual tax rates over the
eleven-year period. The left side of Figure 4.2 shows that eleven-year and annual tax
rates are similar over the income distribution, but that the bottom three deciles have
higher eleven-year tax rates than annual tax rates. The gap is about 5 percentage
points for the bottom decile, but only about 2 percentage points for the second
decile and 1 percentage point for the third decile. The right side of Figure 4.2 shows
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that eleven-year income is higher than annual income at the bottom of the distribu-
tion, which should explain much of the gap between eleven-year and annual tax rates.
There is no gap between annual and eleven-year tax rates at the top of the
distribution. This results from the relatively small amount of income variability in
this part of the distribution. In Chapter 2, we saw that there was a negligible amount
of five-year income variability in the top of the distribution in the early 1980s (Table
2.4). In the next section, we see a gap between annual and lifetime effective tax rates
emerge in the top two deciles. This may be because lifetime earnings variability may
capture life-cycle changes not captured over eleven years.
One issue with this analysis is that intermittent filers and non-filers are not
included. Including them would likely exacerbate the gap between multi-year and
annual tax rates at the bottom of the distribution. However, it is not clear how to
include these tax units in the sample as it is not evident which tax units did not file
because they exited the sample due to marriage, divorce, or death. Even if non-filing
tax units did not exit the sample for these reasons, it is not clear how to impute their
incomes. About 47 percent of tax units did not have positive income tax liabilities
in 2009 (Williams, 2009). While much of this was a function of lower incomes and
tax rates due to the recession, a significant fraction are explained by many tax units
having no income in a specific year because of income variability. Following these
non-taxpaying tax units over multiple years shows that many will end up with larger
incomes and positive tax burdens over the long run. The next section on individual
tax rates allows me to better address non-filing, as there are no filing status changes
for individuals, and there is no non-filing due to low incomes for Social Security
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taxable earnings.
Figure 4.2 : Annual and eleven-year tax unit average tax rates and cash income: 1985
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Note: The same individuals are used to estimate eleven-year and annual tax rates, but income groups
may include different individuals. Eleven-year income groups are set with average incomes from 1980
to 1990 and annual income groups are set with annual incomes. So workers in the bottom decile in
one year could be in a higher decile over the entire eleven- year period. Annual tax rates are smoothed
by averaging over the eleven- year period. Incomes are for non-dependents in the CWHS and only
tax units present all eleven years are included in the sample. Incomes and taxes are averaged over
eleven years after setting to 2010 dollars with the CPI-U-RS.
4.3 Differences in tax progressivity across individuals
I use a Social Security Administration earnings panel to estimate individual income
tax progressivities. Earnings variability means that lifetime effective tax rates are
higher than annual effective tax rates at the bottom of the distribution and lower
than annual effective tax rates at the top of the distribution.
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It is not clear how to estimate federal individual tax liabilities using only in-
dividual earnings because this excludes non-earnings income sources and spousal
income. The analysis in this section deals with these issues by estimating federal tax
burdens as if each individual filed separately and their only income was earnings.
This is done by subtracting one personal exemption and the standard deduction
from earnings up to the Social Security taxable limit and then calculating the tax
burden based on the remaining taxable earnings. This will understate income, as
all non-earnings income is ignored—but note that earnings still make up about
three-quarters of income3—and because top-coding will exclude some earnings in
the top two deciles in early years and the top decile in later years. The exclusion
of non-earnings will especially tend to bias effective tax rates at the top of the
distribution, as they accrue the majority of non-earnings income. Tax rates at the
top of the distribution will also be biased by the exclusion of non-earnings income and
earnings above the Social Security taxable maximum amount. I ignore payroll taxes
because this section’s strictly tax side analysis does not capture any of the progressive
benefits of Social Security and Medicare. Also, proportional payroll taxes on taxable
earnings should primarily increase the tax rate levels in the following estimates
while not affecting the substantive findings for tax rate heterogeneity or progressivity.
Social Security earnings data allow an analysis of thirty-one year average earnings,
or what I will refer to as lifetime earnings. Using a ten percent subsample of the
EPUF panel dataset (described in Chapter 3), these lifetime earnings are centered in
1991 and so include annual earnings from 1976 to 2006. As only individuals turning
3The 1993 IRS Individual Complete Report (Publication 1304) Table 1.4 shows that total salaries
and wages were 78 percent of adjusted gross income.
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25 to 60 years old and considered to be in their “working life” all thirty-one years are
included in the sample, the remaining individuals turn 40 to 45 years old in 1991.4
This leaves 12,848 individuals in the sample, most of whom are male. This is the
latest period possible to study with this data, which means most of the top-coding
issues early in the sample are avoided. Earnings above the taxable limit are still
top-coded, meaning earnings variability at the top of the distribution will be biased
downward, especially in the tenth decile. Lifetime earnings and taxes are averaged
over thirty-one years after setting all values to 2010 dollars with the CPI-U.
Compared to annual tax rates, lifetime tax rates have much less heterogeneity
within earnings deciles (Figure 4.3). As with tax units, most of the compression
of within earnings group tax rates happens at the top of the distribution. Using
lifetime tax rates rather than eleven-year tax rates, we also see a compression of low
within-decile tax rates over the entire distribution (note that the 5th percentile of
rates moves up towards median tax rates). So while workers who have low earnings
in a given year or even over eleven-years will pay very low tax rates, over their
lifetime they will pay substantially higher tax rates.
Figure 4.3 makes clear some of the vertical and horizontal equity problems
that can results from earnings variability in a progressive tax system. Workers in the
bottom lifetime earnings decile pay between 0 and 9 percent lifetime tax rates (at the
5th and 95th tax rate percentiles). The lifetime tax rates paid by some individuals in
4An individual’s “working life” begins with their first positive earnings once they turn 25 years
old and ends with their final positive earnings before turning 61. This means someone with positive
earnings at age 25 and retiring at age 54 will only have thirty years in their working life and so be
excluded from the lifetime sample.
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the bottom decile are equal to those paid by some in the fifth decile. This horizontal
inequity decreases for higher lifetime earnings, as in the eighth decile where the tax
rate gap falls to only about 3 percentage points. Note that none of these differences
come from income sources or deductions, as discussed in the previous section. This
is because all taxes in this section are based on earnings and the standard deduction
is applied to everyone, hence all the horizontal inequity seen in Figure 3.3 comes
from the interaction between earnings variability and a progressive tax system.
Figure 4.3 : Annual and lifetime (31-year) estimated individual tax rates: 1991
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Note: The middle line is the earnings decile median tax rate. The dashed lines are the 25th and 75th
tax rate percentiles and the dotted lines are the 5th and 95th percentiles. Taxes are estimated using
individual Social Security taxable earnings as the income base for the U.S. federal personal income
tax, where the standard deduction and one personal exemption are subtracted from earnings before
applying individual tax rates. The tenth decile is not shown for annual tax rates and whited-out
for lifetime tax rates because of taxable earnings top-coding. These two figures include the same
individuals in each decile. Earnings are for individuals turning 25 to 60 years old in the EPUF
and only individuals in their working life” all thirty-one years are included in the sample, so only
those turning 40 to 45 years old in 1991. Annual tax rates are only in 1991. Lifetime tax rates are
average taxes divided by average earnings over thirty-one years (centered in 1991, so from 1976 to
2006) where incomes and taxes are averaged after setting to 2010 dollars with the CPI-U.
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As with the similar analysis of tax units, individuals in the bottom decile have a
multi-year tax rate 4 percentage points higher than their annual rate (Figure 4.4,
left side). While this gap diminishes for the second decile of tax units, it persists for
the second and third deciles of individuals. The gap is only 2 percentage points in
the fourth decile and about 1 percentage point in the fifth and sixth deciles.
The gaps between lifetime and annual tax rates follow the pattern of gaps be-
tween lifetime and annual earnings (Figure 4.4, right side). One difference is that
tax rates cross in the seventh decile while earnings cross at the bottom of the fifth
decile ($50,000 versus $30,000). Progressive taxes, including the implicit zero rate
from exclusions and the standard deduction, mean that these low lifetime earnings
workers will pay substantial taxes in those years of high earnings. This explains the
large gap between lifetime and annual tax rates at the bottom of the distribution
and the small gap in earnings.
4.4 Conclusion
Although estimates often focus on annual progressivity because of the abundance
of cross-sectional data, a welfare perspective seems more consistent with multi-year
tax progressivity. I estimate eleven-year and lifetime tax progressivity and compare
them to annual tax progressivity. While on an annual basis, those at the bottom of
the distribution pay little or no federal income taxes, on a lifetime basis they pay
effective tax rates about five percentage points higher.
Income variability causes annual and lifetime federal effective tax rates to dif-
100
Figure 4.4 : Annual and lifetime tax rates and earnings: 1991
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with the CPI-U.
fer in a progressive tax system. This is because for two workers with the same
lifetime income, the worker with the more variable income will pay more taxes over
their lifetime. I estimate that this horizontal inequity implies that in most deciles
some workers pay lifetime effective federal income tax rates five percentage points
than other workers in the same decile. While the progressivity of annual taxes leads
to this inequity, a more progressive tax system also provides insurance when there
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is imperfect consumption smoothing (Eaton and Rosen, 1980; Varian, 1980; Conesa
and Krueger, 2006). This is because annual tax rates will increase in years of positive
income shocks and decrease in years of negative shocks. This means we can also
think of the vertical and horizontal equity trade-off as an insurance and horizontal
equity trade-off.
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Appendix A
Generalized Entropy Measures
Theil Index =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi
x¯
· lnxi
x¯
)
(A1)
Mean Log Deviation (MLD) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
ln
x¯
xi
)
(A2)
Symmetric Theil =
Theil +MLD
2
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
[(xi
x¯
− 1
)
ln (xi)
]
(A3)
Atkinson Index = 1 − 1
x¯
(
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
x1−εi
)1/(1−ε)
(A4)
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Tax policy and top income shares: 1940 to 1986
To put into context the 1986 to 1988 increase of business pass-through income and
wages among the top one percent, I turn to the interaction of changing tax policy and
top income concentration in other periods. I first consider falling inequality during
World War II and then the period of stable top income concentration during the 1970s.
Between 1940 and 1943—the early part of the period known as the Great
Compression—top one percent income shares fell about four percentage points. This
fall was caused by a decrease of five percentage points for wages and dividends
combined and a one percentage point decrease in interest and rents (Figure 2.8).5
However, these decreases were offset by a two percentage point increase in business
pass-through income.
A confluence of policy changes caused the Great Compression. The fall in top
one percent wages was likely caused by wage controls by the National War Labor
Board, which limited wage growth of top earners between 1942 and 1945 (Goldin
and Margo, 1992; Piketty and Saez, 2004). Meanwhile, the fall in dividends may
have been precipitated by a sharp increase in corporate tax rates: the top marginal
statutory corporate rate increased from 19 to 40 percent between 1939 and 1942,
while the average rate increased from 18 to 53 percent due to the wartime excess
profits tax. The shift to pass-through income during WWII may have offered some
temporary reprieve from these high corporate tax rates. With the expiration of
5Note that the initial fall in dividends at the onset of the Great Depression followed a surge
in the late 1920s stock market run-up. The spike in dividends in 1936 and 1937 was a temporary
response to the undistributed profits tax (Holland, 1962).
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the excess profits tax in 1947, pass-through income among the top one percent
fell dramatically and this trend continued through the 1950s. Thus the WWII era
income shifting into pass-through income was an episodic event.
In order to examine the period of low and stable top income shares in the
1970s, I first compare tax burdens on corporate and pass-through income. Figure
A5 attempts to compare tax rates faced by closely-held business owners in the top
of the distribution. These owners are more likely to be able to minimize their tax
burden by switching between C-corporation and pass-through entity status. We
can see the relative advantage of filing status by comparing the marginal personal
tax rate that would apply to pass-through income at the 99.9th percentile and the
average corporate tax rate plus dividend taxes. The “effective” corporate tax rate is
constructed by first dividing the total corporate taxes paid in a year by net corporate
income. This average corporate tax rate is then added to the personal rate applicable
to the residual income. This double taxation component is estimated by taking half
the residual and applying the dividends tax rate, i.e., the P99.9 personal rate. In
later years, capital gains become the dominant form of paying out corporate profits,
and so instead of applying the dividends tax rate, the capital gains tax is applied to
the entire income remaining after paying corporate taxes.
Figure A5 shows a number of clear trends. Between 1920 and 1970, similar
tax rates were applied to C-corporation income and business pass-through income
for those at the top of the distribution—although a temporary gap emerged during
the five years after the excess profits tax expired and before corporate tax rates
increased. During this period the C-corporation and pass-through income as a
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fraction of GDP also moved together (Figure A6).
S-corporations, created in 1958, allowed pass-through income to enjoy the
benefits of limited liability, although with some additional restrictions relative to
C-corporations.6 Despite the more favorable treatment of pass-through income with
limited liability, there appears to have a been a shifting out of pass-through entities
and into C-corporations, with the gap between the two forms of income growing
from 2 percent of GDP in the 1960s to 4 percent between 1975 and 1985 (see Figure
A6) Between 1970 and 1986, C-corporation income faced a lower “effective” tax rate
than business pass-through income (Figure A5). Not surprisingly, in the 1970s there
was increased income sheltering into C-corporations (Gordon and Slemrod, 2000).
Koowattanatianchai, Charles and Eddie (2009, p. 8) give reasons for falling average
corporate tax burdens: “In 1971, another major change in depreciation practice
occurred. Treasury created the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system, which
allowed firms to write off their assets over a period that was, in most cases, 20%
shorter than the 1962 guidelines allowed.”
6S-corporations must be domestic enterprises and were originally restricted to being owned by
U.S. residents. The number of shareholders was initially limited to 15; this was increased to 35 in
1982, again to 75 in 1996, and most recently to 100 in 2005 (Sullivan, 2011).
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Tables and Figures
Table A1 : Income percentile cutoffs for “non-retired” CWHS sample
1979 Cutoff 1990 Cutoff
1979 1990 to Median to Median
Cutoff Cutoff Ratio Median Ratio
25th
Percentile
Earnings 11,900 14,100 0.38 0.43
Cash Income, with CG 15,900 19,200 0.46 0.51
After-Tax Cash Income 15,200 18,500 0.49 0.54
Median
Earnings 31,000 32,500 – –
Cash Income, with CG 35,300 37,700 – –
After-Tax Cash Income 37,800 34,200 – –
75th
Percentile
Earnings 58,300 61,100 1.88 1.88
Cash Income, with CG 63,000 67,500 1.82 1.80
After-Tax Cash Income 55,000 59,700 1.77 1.74
90th
Percentile
Earnings 84,500 94,500 2.72 2.91
Cash Income, with CG 93,500 105,800 2.69 2.80
After-Tax Cash Income 78,600 90,900 2.52 2.66
99th
Percentile
Earnings 171,000 235,500 5.51 7.24
Cash Income, with CG 217,000 309,900 6.58 8.21
After-Tax Cash Income 164,500 248,700 5.33 7.26
Note: All values in 2010 dollars using the CPI-U-RS.
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Table A2 : Smoothed annual income and earnings inequality increase and fraction
explained by eleven-year variability
Fraction Annual Annual Annual Percentage Fraction Annual
Inequality Inequality Inequality Annual Inequality
from Variability Increase due Increase Inequality Increase
1985 2004 to Variability Increase from Variability
Panel A: Cash Income
Mean Log Deviation 30% 30% 0.0419 0.1374 39% 30%
Symmetric Theil 26% 23% 0.0272 0.1686 46% 16%
Theil Index 22% 17% 0.0124 0.1998 53% 6%
Atkinson (ε=0.75) 18% 17% 0.0108 0.0746 35% 14%
Atkinson (ε=0.50) 16% 14% 0.0057 0.0580 39% 10%
Atkinson (ε=0.25) 15% 11% 0.0001 0.0338 43% 0%
Gini Coefficient 7% 10% 0.0187 0.0878 22% 21%
Panel B: After-Tax Cash Income
Mean Log Deviation 33% 35% 0.0527 0.1272 40% 41%
Symmetric Theil 29% 28% 0.0325 0.1367 42% 24%
Theil Index 25% 20% 0.0124 0.1462 43% 8%
Atkinson (ε=0.75) 21% 20% 0.0119 0.0623 33% 19%
Atkinson (ε=0.50) 18% 16% 0.0044 0.0444 34% 10%
Atkinson (ε=0.25) 18% 11% -0.0023 0.0226 32% —
Gini Coefficient 8% 12% 0.0247 0.0831 22% 30%
Panel C: Earnings
Mean Log Deviation 19% 32% 0.0889 0.1720 67% 52%
Symmetric Theil 12% 26% 0.0879 0.2127 87% 41%
Theil Index 4% 19% 0.0839 0.2502 108% 34%
Atkinson (ε=0.75) 14% 22% 0.0343 0.0927 55% 37%
Atkinson (ε=0.50) 11% 22% 0.0268 0.0746 66% 36%
Atkinson (ε=0.25) 8% 23% 0.0201 0.0507 89% 40%
Gini Coefficient 5% 7% 0.0125 0.0782 22% 16%
Note: Eleven-year average incomes are centered from t-5 to t+5. Annual inequalities are not
smoothed. Only tax units in the CWHS and Edited Panel “non-retired samples” all eleven years
of each eleven-year period are included in annual and multi-year samples ($2010, CPI-U-RS). An-
nual and eleven-year income measures only include tax units with average earnings throughout the
eleven-year period above the threshold ($2,575 in 2004 and indexed with average earnings) and earn-
ings measures only include tax units with positive earnings all eleven years of each eleven-year period.
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Table A3 : Smoothed annual tax unit earnings inequality and increase from earnings
variability (zero and negative earnings included)
Fraction Annual Annual Annual Percentage Fraction Annual
Inequality Inequality Inequality Annual Inequality
from Variability Change due Change Inequality Change
to Variability Increase from Variability
Panel A: Five-year Variability 1983-86 2002-05
Mean Log Deviation 47% 24% -0.1666 -0.1550 -27% 107%
Symmetric Theil 34% 19% -0.0666 0.0023 1% —
Theil Index 12% 13% 0.0204 0.1466 44% 14%
Atkinson (ε=0.75) 25% 13% -0.0350 -0.0173 -6% —
Atkinson (ε=0.50) 18% 10% -0.0129 0.0093 6% —
Atkinson (ε=0.25) 14% 6% -0.0063 0.0125 15% -51%
Gini Coefficient 5% 7% 0.0127 0.0351 8% 36%
Panel B: Eleven-year Variability 1985 2004
Mean Log Deviation 58% 32% -0.2160 -0.1835 -30% 118%
Symmetric Theil 43% 25% -0.0809 0.0020 0% —
Theil Index 12% 19% 0.0542 0.1874 65% 29%
Atkinson (ε=0.75) 34% 19% -0.0413 -0.0113 -4% —
Atkinson (ε=0.50) 24% 15% -0.0107 0.0192 12% —
Atkinson (ε=0.25) 17% 11% -0.0030 0.0189 26% -16%
Gini Coefficient 7% 11% 0.0194 0.0577 14% 34%
Note: Multi-year average incomes are centered. For five-year periods, annual inequalities are
smoothed by averaging annual inequalities from t-2 to t+2, and then five-year inequalities are aver-
aged over each four year period (1983-86 and 2002-05) before calculating other values. Eleven-year
annual inequalities are not smoothed. Only tax units in the CWHS and Edited Panel “non-retired
samples” all years of each multi-year period are included in annual and multi-year samples ($2010,
CPI-U-RS). Annual and multi-year income measures only include tax units with average earnings
throughout the multi-year period above the threshold ($2,575 in 2004 and indexed with average earn-
ings).
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Figure A1 : Absolute earnings variability for tax units with any self-employment
income in the sample and those with none
 
Note: Variance of arc-percent change in real annual earnings between initial and final years. Only
tax units in the CWHS “non-retired sample” sample in both the initial and final year are included
and earnings cutoffs are based on initial year earnings.
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Figure A2 : Absolute earnings variability for tax units filing married and together or
as another filing status
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Figure A3 : Top one percent and one-hundreth of one percent income shares (no
capital gains)
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Note: To make data comparable with Piketty and Saez (2003), the number of zero earners added to
the CWHS and Edited Panel were adjusted so that the annual shares of the five-year sample match
Piketty and Saez shares. Source: Piketty Saez (2003, updated 2010 and 2012).
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Figure A4 : Top one-hundreth of one percent income shares (no capital gains)
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Figure A5 : Marginal personal income tax rate at the 99.9th percentile and “effective”
corporate tax rates
   
Note: “Effective” corporate tax rate is the sum of the average corporate tax rate (total taxes paid
divided by total net corporate income) and the personal component of corporate taxation, which is
applied to half of the after-corporate tax net income at the 99.9th percentile personal rate and since
1981 the capital gains tax is applied to the entire after-corporate tax net income (with a 60 percent
exclusion until 1985). Sources: IRS, Piketty and Saez (2003), www.ctj.org/pdf/regcg.pdf
Figure A6 : Corporate and business pass-through income as a fraction of GDP
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Appendix B
Creating weights based on age, cohort and sex
To make the SSA data representative of the U.S. labor force for each year,
the fraction of the fraction of the civilian labor force by age groups and
gender are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (see
www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0591.xls). Missing years
are interpolated. Age groups include 16-19, 20-24, 25-34, 45-54, 55-64, and 65 years
and over. Ten-year age groups are divided into five-year groups. The fraction of
female workers to male workers doubles from 42 to 85 percent between 1951 and
1995.
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Table B2 : Robustness checks for Table 3.1: Increasing individual earnings inequality
and variability for bottom half of distribution, excluding zero earnings: 1973-1985
3 years 5 years 11 years 21 years 31 years
Panel A: Robustness Checks of Fraction Annual Inequality Increase from Variability
P30 61% 65% 68% 74% 80%
Symmetric Theil
P40 52% 59% 65% 70% 79%
P50 (>Half period) 76% 85% 91% 89% 86%
P50 (Avg.>Threshold) 69% 65% 71% 65% 76%
P50 (Annual>Threshold) 69% 72% 80% 62% 71%
P50 (All Ages >15) 34% 43% 55% 66% 76%
P50 42% 49% 59% 64% 76%
P60 35% 41% 53% 60% 73%
1972-84 46% 54% 64% 70% 77%
1974-86 49% 54% 59% 57% 68%
Gini Coefficient
P30 55% 57% 64% 54% 66%
P40 36% 40% 51% 49% 66%
P50 (>Half period) 26% 34% 52% 45% 43%
P50 (Avg.>Threshold) 34% 33% 48% 48% 66%
P50 (Annual>Threshold) 38% 39% 57% 48% 62%
P50 (All Ages >15) 25% 35% 47% 52% 67%
P50 23% 26% 43% 48% 66%
P60 16% 21% 37% 47% 65%
1972-84 27% 37% 53% 58% 71%
1974-86 34% 33% 35% 31% 52%
Panel B: Fraction of sample top-coded (averaged over multi-year periods)
Initial Year
P30 1% 1% 4% 10% 15%
P40 1% 3% 8% 16% 21%
P50 (>Half period) 3% 6% 11% 17% 22%
P50 (Avg.>Threshold) 3% 7% 14% 23% 27%
P50 (Annual>Threshold) 3% 7% 14% 23% 27%
P50 (All Ages >15) 1% 3% 6% 17% 23%
P50 3% 7% 14% 23% 27%
P60 8% 13% 21% 29% 32%
1972-84 7% 9% 16% 25% 29%
1974-86 2% 4% 11% 20% 25%
Final Year
P30 0% 0% 0% 0% 3%
P40 0% 0% 0% 1% 4%
P50 (>Half period) 0% 0% 0% 1% 4%
P50 (Avg.>Threshold) 0% 0% 0% 1% 5%
P50 (Annual>Threshold) 0% 0% 0% 1% 5%
P50 (All Ages >15) 0% 0% 0% 1% 4%
P50 0% 0% 0% 1% 5%
P60 0% 0% 0% 2% 7%
1972-84 0% 0% 0% 1% 7%
1974-86 0% 0% 0% 1% 4%
Note: Sample set as in Table 3.1 except for changes to cutoffs and age restrictions. Threshold is $2,575 in 2004
and indexed with average earnings.
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Table B3 : Annual male earnings inequality and variability for men in the bottom
half of the distribution, zero annual earnings excluded
Fraction Annual Annual Inequality Annual Fraction Annual
Inequality Increase due Inequality Inequality Increase
from Variability to Variability Increase from Variability
1973 1985
Symmetric
Theil
3Years 33% 35% 0.0345 0.0936 37%
5 Years 40% 43% 0.0424 0.0910 47%
11 Years 48% 53% 0.0554 0.0970 57%
21 Years 51% 62% 0.0530 0.0733 72%
31 Years 52% 72% 0.0630 0.0728 86%
Atkinson
Index
(ε=0.5)
3 Years 31% 32% 0.0134 0.0395 34%
5 Years 38% 40% 0.0168 0.0389 43%
11 Years 46% 51% 0.0232 0.0423 55%
21 Years 49% 61% 0.0237 0.0335 71%
31 Years 50% 71% 0.0288 0.0336 86%
Variance of
Log Earnings
3 Years 43% 43% 0.751 1.765 43%
5 Years 50% 52% 0.924 1.748 53%
11 Years 59% 60% 1.165 1.936 60%
21 Years 63% 70% 0.784 1.075 73%
31 Years 66% 80% 0.948 1.140 83%
Gini
Coefficient
3 Years 17% 17% 0.0127 0.0721 18%
5 Years 21% 22% 0.0184 0.0751 25%
11 Years 25% 30% 0.0375 0.0948 40%
21 Years 22% 36% 0.0585 0.0996 59%
31 Years 16% 45% 0.0874 0.1129 77%
Note: Sample set as in Table 3.2 and then women dropped.
Table B4 : Smoothed individual earnings inequality and variability the bottom half
of the distribution, zero annual earnings excluded
Fraction Smoothed Smoothed Annual Smoothed Fraction Smoothed
Annual Inequality Inequality Increase Annual Annual Inequality
from Variability due to Variability Inequality Increase
1973 1985 Increase from Variability
Symmetric
Theil
3 Years 27% 31% 0.0245 0.0545 45%
5 Years 38% 39% 0.0201 0.0475 42%
11 Years 43% 47% 0.0327 0.0599 55%
Atkinson
Index
(e=0.5)
3 Years 24% 28% 0.0094 0.0225 42%
5 Years 35% 36% 0.0076 0.0198 38%
11 Years 40% 44% 0.0136 0.0258 53%
Variance of
Log Earnings
3 Years 38% 42% 0.537 1.160 46%
5 Years 50% 52% 0.595 1.099 54%
11 Years 57% 54% 0.529 1.004 53%
Note: Sample set as in Table 3.2, but annual earnings are smoothed by averaging over multi-year periods.
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Figure B1 : Annual log percentile ratios of individual earnings of womenand all
workers. Comparison of Social Security Administration data (BEPUF) and data
used in Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010, KSS)
   
Note: Both data sets include workers aged 25 to 60 and with annual earnings above a threshold
($2,575 in 2004 indexed using the SSA average wages). The KSS data are for commerce and indus-
try earnings only, excluding earnings of government employees, agriculture, hospitals, educational
services, social services, religious and membership organizations, and private households, as well as
self-employment earnings.
Figure B2 : Absolute variability for men by five-year centered age cohorts including
zeros for bottom half of the individual earnings distribution
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Note: Variance of arc percentage change in real annual earnings between year t and t+1. Trends
are the same for t+5 and t+10. BEPUF set as in Table 3.2, except medians are set by initial year
earnings, excluding zeros.
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Figure B3 : Comparison of “full-time” median individual earnings in Census and
EPUF data
 
Note: Census data for full-time, year-round workers. EPUF data is Social Security Administration
earnings and includes those who are at least 16 years old and in order to remove non-full-time
workers, drops those with earnings below 1.5 times the full-year full-time minimum wage ($10,300
in 2004) indexed by nominal average wages ($2010, CPI-U).
Figure B4 : Annual log percentile ratios of individual earnings of women and all
workers. Comparison of Social Security Administration data (EPUF, 5% sample)
and data used in Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2010, KSS)
 
Note: Both data sets include workers aged 25 to 60 and with annual earnings above a threshold
($2,575 in 2004 indexed using the SSA average wages). The KSS data are for commerce and indus-
try earnings only, excluding earnings of government employees, agriculture, hospitals, educational
services, social services, religious and membership organizations, and private households, as well as
self-employment earnings.
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Figure B5 : Absolute annual variability of bottom two quintiles (EPUF)
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Note: Absolute variability measured by variance of annual arc percentage earnings changes (between
years t and t+1, t+2, and t+4). The sample only includes workers in the EPUF turning 25 to 60
years old. The left figures only includes workers with positive earnings in both the initial and final
years. The right figures adds wrokers with zero earnings in either or both of the initial and final
years. P40 cutoffs are set by initial year earnings for the sample including both men and women but
excluding zeros. ($2010, CPI-U).
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